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Workers strike against slave wages 
Strikes, work-stoppages and demonstrations are sweeping through the satellite industrial towns on the 
outskirts of Jakarta and in other parts of Java. Workers, mostly women and young girls, are demanding 
an end to slave wages and recognition of the right to organise. Political and Security Affairs Mi11,ister-
Coordinator, Sudomo announced' he would·investigate workers' actions because they could undermine 
political stability and stifle economic gtowth. 
Since 1986, the Suharto regime has promoted export-led 
economic expansion in order to· reduce the country's 
dependence on exchange earnings from oil and natural gas. 
In the industrial sector, many companies from abroad, in 
particular the so-called NICs (New Industrial Countries), 
Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand and Singapore, have· built 
factories making shoes, garments, wrapping material, 
assembling toys and canning food, attracted by the low 
wages in Indonesia and the absence of a trade union 
movement capable of defending workers' rights and better 
conditions. 
Slave wages 
In order to appear to be protecting workers against low 
wages, the government constantly reiterates its policy of 
enforcing regulations regarding minimum wages which 
range· from Rp. 850 a day ·in some regions to Rp. 2,600 in 
Jakarta; the latter is worth around $1.30. Manpower 
Minister Cosmas Batubara himself admits that the minimum 
wage is equivalent to only 60 per cent of a person's basic 
needs. In fact, it is far worse than that. Referring to a recent 
study, the Far Eastern Economic Review writes: "For a 
married worker with two children in Jakarta, the minimum 
wage provides 31 per cent of minimum physical needs. For 
a married worker with three children in West Java, the 
minimum wage provides 15 per cent of minimum physical 
needs." [far Eastern Economic Review, 20 June 1991]. 
Writing in February this year, the Financial ·Times 
referred to Indonesia's "officially-sanctioned low wages", 
and said this plus the "almost total absence of Jabour 
unrest" has been one of the main factors: attractmg large 
amounts of foreign capital to the country. (Financial Times, 
15 February 1991 l 
The vast majority of factories pay their workers much less 
than the minimum Wage and the government i~ powerless 
or indeed unwilling to do anything about it. According to 
an economist in Semarang, 90 per cent of all enterprises in 
Central Java fail to pay their employees the minimum wage. 
Ors ~urutal HW warned that the pressures on grossly 
underpaid workers in the private sector could only intensify 
following a government decision last month to increase the 
salaries of government employees and members .of the 
armed forces by 15 per cent. (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 10 June 
1991) 
Many of the strikes in the past few months have drawn 
attention. not only to slave wages but to other infringements 
of workers' rights. One very common grievance is that 
employers insist on workers doing several hours' overtime 
every day, with little extra pay - and anyone refusing to 
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STRIKES 
work overtime is punished by having their wages cut. Many 
workers are not allowed any days off, working through the 
weekend and on public holidays. 
Strikes, the only way out 
The other side of the coin is the abysmal state of the right 
to organise. The only union permitted to exist is the SPSI, 
the All-Indonesian Labourers' Union. Even though the SPSI 
is widely regarded as nothing more than an extension of the 
government, many employers obstruct moves by their 
workforce to set up SPSI branches. When workers in some 
factories have tried to create an SPSI branch as a way to 
improve their bargaining position vis-a-vis the company, 
they soon discover that this is not a simple democratic 
procedure. A ministerial decision introduced in 1986, when 
Sudomo was Manpower Minister,. gives management a 
decisive say over who may be elected to lead an SPSI 
branch. No wonder workers tend to regard their local SPSI 
branch, where one does exist, as being closer to the boss 
than to them. 
Pengusaha = Boss, Pekerja = Worker 
Kebutuhan Fisik Minimum = Basic Physical Needs 
Formally speaking, the right to strike is no longer out-
lawed, following a government decision last year to revoke 
a late fifties presidential decree banning strikes in 'vital 
enterprises'. But the Manpower Minister made the govern-
ment's view clear on the matter last November, when he 
said: "The right to strike is protected under the constitution, 
but exercise of that right is still not tolerated in Indonesia 
because it is harmful to all sides." [Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 20 June 1991] 
Hemmed in by these restrains on their freedom to defend 
their rights and improve their wages, workers in many of 
the new industrial estates are resorting to strikes and work-
stoppages. There have been so many lightning strikes in the 
last few months that space does not permit mention of more 
than a fraction of them. 
In May, 3,000 workers at the garment factory, PT Ever 
Shinetex in Bogor went on strike for better wages, for a 
collective agreement, for the payment of transport allow-
ances and for sick pay. They also demanded that the 
company pay them seven days' overtime money owed for 
work performed during the Lebaran holiday week. Accord-
ing to one of the strike organisers, workers had been forced 
to do the overtime when the only factory gate had been 
locked. Workers were warned that those who refused to 
work through the holiday period would be ~eked. . 
Spirits ran high during the two-day strike, with the 
women workers filling the courtyard in front of the factoir, 
singing songs and shouting slogans. Troops were out m 
force to intimidate the mostly female workforce. Although 
some of the demands were met, the employers later took 
reprisals against the activists, assisted by the local ~il!tary 
command. Six workers who visited the Manpower MJDJStry 
in Jakarta to discuss their grievances were summarily 
sacked and summoned by the military for questioning about 
their views of the New Order, their understanding of 
Pancasila, whether they had been involved in illegal 
gatherings and so on. 
The company has since announced plans to sack 300 
workers and replaced them with 'more skilled' workers. 
Already 40 workers have been fired. [Pelita, 26 June 1991) 
A strike involving 2,000 workers at · the Great Rivers 
Garment Industries factory near Bogor on 19 and 20 June 
was widely reJX>rted in the press. In this instance, the list of 
demands was conveyed to the management by SPSI leaders. 
Troops were brought in to try to restore order, claiming 
they had come to protect the premises from physical attack. 
On the second day of the strike, the management 
announced that six of the 22 demands would be met. 
At around the same time, strikes were taking place at 
Trinunggal Komara factory in Cibinong where 2,600 
workers downed tools, at a lamp factory in Surabaya where 
150 women workers walked out after failing to persuade the 
employers to pay them a better wage, at MPG factory in 
Bogor where 500 workers demanded action against foreign 
staff from Korea for treating them very badly, and at the 
Dahwa Prima Indonesia shoe factory in Tangerang after the 
company refused to raise wages to the minimum set by the 
government. 
End military involvement 
Besides strikes at the workplace, demonstrations have 
occurred, with many dozens of workers' representatives 
from several factories going to the Department of ·Man-
power. In one such demonstration, some three hundred 
workers, mostly women, from factories in Cimanggis, 
Citeureup, Cibinong and Bekasi gathered outside the 
Department for over three hours demanding better wages, 
condemning the SPSI as "toothless", calling for an end to 
compulsory overtime and demanding that company bosses 
who maltreat their workers or violate regulations should be 
charged in court. They also called on the Minister to annul 
a 1986 ministerial decree to involve the military in the 
resolution of labour disputes. 
A week later, workers' representatives from Ever Shinetex 
and four other factories in Cimanggis, Bogor also called for 
an end to military involvement in labour disputes. At a 
press conference given by some fifty workers, they insisted 
that strikers should not be treated like criminals. A worker 
who refused to give her name, from PT Great River 
Garment Industries - wh~re strike action has been under 
way for some time - spoke of the frustration · among 
workers with grievances, because of the procedures avail-
able to them. 
The difficulty arises from . a ministerial decision, also 
introduced by Sudomo in 1986, which says that when a 
'wild strike' breaks out, the company should act in 
coordination with the local administration, police and 
military command to prevent any physical assaults by the 
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strikers. Following a strike at a factory in Ciluar, Bogor in 
May, twenty strike leaders were held for eight days at the 
local police station. But the ultimate penalty for strike 
leaders, even when some of the demands are met by the 
company, is di&missal .. [Tempo, 8 June 1991] 
Sudomo to ·investigate 
The wave of strikes has led Sudomo, Minister-Coordinator 
for Political and Security Affairs, to announce that an 
investig•on. will begin to discover who is. ':rnastermim\ing' 
the strikes. Referring to the work.-stoppage at the Great 
River Garment Industries factory, Sudomo said: "How could 
2,000 workers at a c<>mpany go on strike at the same time 
if they were not coordinated?" [Jakarta Post, 1 July 1991] 
Tempo [13 July] quoted him as saying that firm action 
would be taken against anyone 'up to their tricks'. 
Sudomo was commander of the security agency Kop-
~~ib from 1974. until 1983 when he became Manpower 
MmISter for five years. He evidently has no intention. of 
dropping his heavy-handed . supervision of the country's 
workforce. One newspaper warned him against dealing with 
workers' action as a security matter rather than recognising 
the socio-economic issues that ·underlie the current unrest. 
[Jakarta Post, 1 July 1991) 
A senior official of the Manpower Department said that 
the AFUCIO is the targ~t of Sudo.mo's threat. "The union 
has been pressing Congress and the Bush Administration 
to withdraw trade privileges under the GSP [Generalised 
System of Preferences] from Indonesia. Previous applica-
tions from the AFLJCIO have three times been refused by 
the US Trade Representative. 
In May the AFUCIO submitted a new petition regarding 
workers' rights in Indonesia, complaining that the Setiaka-
wan Free Trade Union has been refused recognition and 
that the right to strike was not being honoured. Accordi.Ilg 
to Tempo, the Indonesian Government feels so threatened 
by this latest move that it has hired a US law firm to help 
it fight off the challenge. 
But Jeffrey Ballinger, the AFUCIO Asia represent~tive, 
based in Jakarta, is doubtful whether the.union wiU wfu the 
case. "Indonesia has a powerful lobby in Washington and 
the US Administration has no intention of sacrificing its ties 
with Indonesia for a number of underpaid workers." 
Jakarta army chief warns 
On top of Sudomo's threat has come a warning from 
Major-General Kentot Harseno, the Jakarta military 
commander, who said his troops will take action against 
workers who demonstrate in the streets or on the premises 
of offices or factories as this would not be .tolerated. "Any 
worker or workers found demonstrating wi11 be arrested and 
brought to trial." He would only allow workers wanting to 
protest about their conditions to go to Parliament, and leave 
the matter with them. 
He also warned that the free trade ,union, Setiakawan, was 
operating illegally and told workers not. to approach it with 
their problems. [Jakarta Pait, 20 July 1991] 
Factory dormitories , . 
Many factories that employ thousands of women insist on 
their employees living in dormitories on factory premises. 
This saves the company money in transport all<>Wances and 
makes it easier to enforce a regime of overtime. Conditions 
in these dormitories are little better than prison. , 
A recent. study describes conditions at the company 
dormitory of the Busano factory, 25 kms from Jakarta. A 
clause in the labour agreement stipulates that "all female 
workers must live in the women's dormitory". 
The dormitory~ design is very basic, just a row of rooms 
enclosed by a 4 to 5 metre masonry wall. The occupants 
are all unmarried employees and they live 8 or 10 people 
in 5-7 squa.re metre rooms equipped with 4 or 5 iron bunk 
beds, a wardrobe and a kitchen. ·The bathrooms at the back 
of each room have only one toilet... The most difficult part 
is changing shifts, having to wake up at 4 am or even 
earlier .... 
The dormitory head is a member of the company hier-
archy charged with direct supervision of the workers. One 
of the tasks is to grant menstrua.tion leave. It is a granted 
right but is extremely difficult to obtain. Workers must 
follow procedures every month in order to be granted their 
leave. One section of the factory which employs nearly 40 
people only giants menstruation leave to 1 or 2 people at 
a time. 
There are many other rules to be obeyed. Workers cannot 
enter the dormitory after 7 pm, cannot meet with people 
outside the enclosure and cannot use cooking utensils. 
Several of the workers describe the factory and dormitories 
as "a' prison". (AMPO, Japan-Asia Quarterly Review, Vol 
22, no. 1] 
An article in a recent issue of Tempo describes the 
tribulations of women workers who live in company 
dormitories. One woman said the security officers impose 
a strict discipline with punishment for anyone breaking the 
rules. There are slaps and punches for anyone returning to 
the dormitory after hours and sometimes an order ·to 
perform a cleaning chore throughout the night. 
So why don't you move?, asked the journalist. "Where 
to?,".· replied the woman. "It's just the same in all the 
factories. For anyone who's a worker, there's no point 
talking about justice." 
Child labour· 
Tempo also reports that many of the workers are wider age. 
One young woman, now 14 years old said she and many 
others were confined for eleven months in a cloths factory 
sewing ladies' underwear. They worked from 7 am to 10 
pm for Rp. 25,000 a month. Sixty..::two under-age girls 
were kept in a dormitory 6 by 8 metres, sleeping on the 
bare floor. "While we were on the job, we were not allowed 
to talk or doze off. The food we got twice a day consisted 
of a C)uarter of a plate of rice, a portion of vegetables and 
a piece of tempe. J\nd the cook was not allowed to use salt 
as this would cause our legs to swell, making it difficwt to 
work the sewing-machine." 
Another horror story comes from a wrapping paper 
factory, Maju Jaya Mas Sejati, North Jakarta where eleven 
youngsters, about 13 years old were isolated in a room from 
8 am to 9 pm every day sticking up cardboard boxes. The 
w?rkshop is ~urrounded by a 4 metre high wall, topped 
with barbed wrre. When they arrived at the factory two and 
a half rears ago,. the company took away all their personal 
belongmgs. Therr suffermgs . came to an end when the 
m?t~er of one of the girls reported that her daughter was 
nussmg and persuaded a local army officer to gain entry to 
the factory and rescue her. [Tempo, 8 June 1991) • 
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Setiakawan leader abducted 
Saut Aritonang, the General Secretary of the recently-established independent trade union, Setiakawan, 
was taken into custody and held for three days by unidentified assailants the day before he was due 
to lead a demonstration outside the office of the International Labour Office in Jakarta. 
Since the creation of Setiakawan last November, the 
government has used underhand tactics and intimidation 
against the union. Although it has refused to give the union 
official recognition, it has refrained from outlawing it, 
knowing that this could lead to international protest · and 
might strengthen the case of the US trade unions, the 
AFUCIO for trade preferences to be withdrawn from 
Indonesia on the grounds of lack of trade union rights. 
It was on Sunday, 2 June that a taxi taking Saut Aritonang 
to his office in was forced to stop by. six armed men in two 
military vehicles, and· forced at gunpoint to go with them to 
an unknown destination. Saut was returning from a visit to 
a hospital where Setiakwan's president, Poncke Princen was 
undergomg treatment. They had diScuss preparations for the 
demonstration on the following day. 
The abduction came after the union's office in Jakarta had 
been subjected to continual surveillance for several days by 
persons recognised as b~ing from army intelligence. On the 
Sunday morning of his abdudion, two intelligence officers 
from the local army office of Bakorstanasda (the regional 
wing of the national stability agency) came to the office 
and asked Saut to accompany them to their headqu;µters to 
provide information about the occupants of the union's 
office. Saut refused to go but provided the information 
requested. 
At the time of his abduction that afternoon, a colleague 
who was riding in the taxi with him was punched in the 
stomach when he got out to see what was happening. Saut's 
abductors did not identify themselves and had no insignia, 
nor did they produce an arrest warrant. As he was driven 
off, Saut was blindfolded and handcuffed and taken to a 
place where he was held for ·four days. The abductors 
grabbed the ignition key of the taxi, making it impossible 
for the driver to give chase. Soon afterwards, the key was 
found on the roadside. 
ILO protest 
The day after Saut's abduction, the demonstration that he 
was to have led took place as scheduled. Some 300 workers 
from a number of factories gathered outside the head office 
of the International Labour Office (ILO) which is located in 
the UN Jakarta headquarters. They had a series of demands 
and complamts which they intended . to hand over to the 
ILO representative but were unable to gain access as the 
entrance was blocked by armed security guards. 
Besides drawing attention to many grievances about 
wages, workers' rights, working hours and trade union 
rights, the demonstration which had been organised by the 
Setiakawan Free Trade Union expressed opposition to tbe 
coming appointment of Indonesia's Manpower Minister, 
Cosmas Batubara as the president of this year's International 
Labour Conference which· was due to commence in Geneva 
on the following day. · 
The day after the demonstration, five workers among them 
Workers from several factories demonstrating in front of the /LO 
office. 
one woman from the DWA sponge factory in Cengkareng, 
West Java who had taken part were taken from their place 
of work without arrest warrants to the Koramil (local 
military command) headquarters and held till midnight. 
They returned home, their faces black and blue from 
beatings. 
Army denies responsibility . 
Saut's abduction was widely reported domestiCally and by 
the international news agencies, a sign that Setiakawan's 
progress is being followed with considerable interest. The 
armed forces issued a press release after he had returned 
home, saying they had no knowledge of the affair. Political 
and Security Affairs Coordination Minister Sudomo also 
feigned ignorance of the abduction and said there would be 
no investigation to discover those responsible; it was up to 
Saut himself to take legal action against his abductors, if he 
so wishes. However, Sudomo knows very well that this is 
not possible as Saut has no idea who they were nor does he 
know where he was taken. 
Accompanied by lawye~~. he visited . the Jakarta Police 
after his release to make a full report ·of his experience. He 
said for the first few hours he was held in a tiny, foul-
smelling room 1 x 1.8 metres, and later transferred to a 
larger room. On the second day of his abduction, he was 
interrogated about the protest about the ILO meeting and 
asked about the union's activities. Before being taken to a 
vehicle which drove him away from his place of abduction, 
he was again blindfolded and driven off to another part of 
Jakarta where he was released. 
Sant: 'Stop the repression!' 
A week after his abduction, Saut issued a statement, calling 
on the security forces to stop curbing political tights. 
"Violence and undemocratic action }"ill never stop labourers 
flaring up if they do not settle the problems of their basic 
rights." ' 
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Yoppy · Matulessi, one of the workers picked up at his 
place of work after the ILO demonstration, said: "We 
complained to the ILO. It's terrible that we were picked up 
by military· officers and got beaten before they released us 
at midnight." He said that other workers had been told they 
risked their jobs if they joined Setiakawan. [Reuter, 10 June 
1991] 
Portuguese walk out of ILO meeting 
Prior to the selection of Cosmas Batubara to preside over 
this year's ILO conference, representatives of the Portuguese 
trade union movement spoke out against the decision, in 
solidarity with the people of East Timor. After Batubara 
was appointed, as the sole candidate for the post, the Portu-
guese trade unionists walked out, followed by the Portu-
guese government representatives and representatives of 
Portuguese employers. 1f.. 
A sixth term for Suharto? 
Electio{lS in Indonesia's ORDE BARU have always been stage-managed and are no indicator of the 
true standing of the political par,ties. (Jnly three parties may contest the elections, by contrast with the 
dozens of parties that participated in the 1955 general elections. Nevertheless, the political atmosphere 
is heating up as the April 1992 elections approach. Political issues have begun to surface. Suharto's 
70th birthday celebrated recently did not escape the attention of political pundits: will he stand for 
another term or will he resign? 
The major issue in the coming election is undoubtedly the 
succession .. If Suharto decides to run for another term, it 
will be his sixth but so far he has been tightlipped. 
Four hundred seats in the DPR (l)ewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat) or Parliament will be fought over by Gollcar, the 
PDi and the PPP. Another 100 parliamentary seats are 
reserved for members of ABRI, the armed forces. In April 
1993, the MPR (Majelis Permrisyawaratan Rakyat), the 
People's Congress, will elect the president. The MPR has a 
thousand members, the 500 DPR members and 500 
appointees (provincial governors, local representatives and 
The seventy-year-old president is now being compared with the 
octogenarian Yang Shang Kun, the Chinese presi"!;nt. 
the lilce). Sixty per cent are therefore appointed and to 
judge by earlier presidential elections, Suharto has nothing 
to fear. Every time since 1968, Suharto has been the sole 
candidate and his 'election' supported by 100 per cent of the 
votes has always been a foregone conclusion. 
Will things will be different this time? 
It was Suharto who started to give signals that this might be 
his last term. In his controversial autobiography· he indi-
cated that his family wanted hint back as the pater famil'ias. 
Last year he invented a ·new term topp, for tua, ompong, 
peot & pikun (old, toothless, shrivelled and senile). In an 
informal meeting at the palace the cunning Suharto made a 
joke about himself, stating that Indonesia doesn't need a 
topp person as president. Typically, this drew a variety of 
responses. The more slavish politicians saw this a hint from 
the boss that he needed more pressure to stand for a sixth 
term; others judged the statement at face-value and con-
cluded that Suharto was planning to step down. 
In the ·meantime· the atmosphere of 'openness' (largely 
initiated and controlled by Suharto) has created more 
leeway to voice opinions in public. A discussion was 
timidly started about having more than one candidate, quite 
unthinkable a few years back. Then Y ahya Nasution, a POI 
leader unexpectedly proposed General Rudini, the powerful 
Interior Minister, as a candidate for the presidency. Nasut-
ion's plunge paved the way for others. The nationalist 
student organisation, GMNI, called for the·•culture of·sole-
candidates' to be abandoned while others said there should 
be nine candidates, three from each political· party. Then 
someone mentioned the name of the high profile Minister 
for Technology BJ. Habibie, darling of the western arms 
producers. 
The discussion about having other candidates still starts 
from the assumption that Suharto will run for a sixth term. 
Others think Suharto should step down in 1993 and plans 
for the succession should start immediately. 
Suharto versus ABRI 
It is a public secret that many at ABRI headquarters do not 
see eye to eye with the president. The huge business 
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'LECTIONS 
interests of the Suharto kids is resented by many officers. 
Political analysts seriously· believe that Suharto is now quite 
vulnerable and the spectacular growth of the Suharto 
business empire will eventually lead to his downfall. Some 
high-placed generals are already taking their distance from 
Suharto, to avoid going down together with the first family. 
After the 1977 general elections, so the story goes, 
Suharto agreed to step down and make way for General 
Surono, the first man in the army at the time. The generals 
and Suharto were said to have reached consensus about the 
idea of Suharto making way for another general. At the last 
moment Suharto backed down, arguing that he had not yet 
finished 'the job' properly. Since 1978, his relations with the 
army leaders have deteriorated and any consensus regarding 
the succession has melted like snow in the midday sun. 
It is now apparent that a major group in ABRI wants more 
pressure on Suharto to resign and allow the first man in 
ABRI, General Try Sutrisno to take over. Somebody had to 
give the sign to Suharto; the ungratifying task fell to Brig. 
General Nurhadi Purwosaputro, spokesperson ofABRI who 
told a New York Times reporter: 
I am just talldng personally, but a lot of us think he has 
served long enough. We want to make sure that his last 
term is successful. It is time for him to retire. It is up to the 
army to make sure there is a smooth transition. (NYI 
Magazine 2 June 1991). 
A month later General Nurhadi retracted his statement, 
claiming that the writer, Margaret Scott had misunderstood 
what he said. Nurhadi may have been scolded by Bina 
Graha (Suharto's office) and forced to retract, but political 
analysts see Nurhadi's earlier statement as a friendly but 
determined attempt at persuading Suharto to leave office in 
1992. This political manoeuvring is bound to increase in the 
coming months. 
Controlling the elections 
The general elections or pemilu (pemilihan umum) have 
always been carefully controlled, from the centre to the 
villages. The 'floating mass' policy is still valid; political 
party campaigning is forbidden below the district level. As 
the majority of Indonesians live in the rural areas, the 
government party, GOLKAR enjoys a huge advantage in 
electioneering in. the vilJages. But here too things are 
gradually changing. Suharto chairs the advisory board of 
GOLKAR and is in full control of the board. The 72 per 
cent of votes won by GOLKAR does not seem to impress 
anybody any more. Suharto is now flirting with Muslim 
groups and intellectuals outside GOLKAR. KORPRI, the 
huge organisation of civil servants was formerly the 
backbone of GOLKAR, as civil servants and their families-
were required to vote for GOLKAR. The influential Minister 
of Defence General Benny Murdani tired of GOLKAR five 
years ago and started flirting with PD/, Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia during in the 1987' elections. 
The PDI has achieved more political cJout with their new 
star, Guruh Sukamoputra, son of the still popular first 
president, Sukarno. The PDI's scoop is being compared with 
parties in other Asian countries where sons, daughters and 
wives of deceased politicians have risen to the top on the 
political scene. Another event that boosted the PDf s 
fortunes was the well-planned event in May when about 50 
retired ABRI officers, joined PD/ with the blessing o~ .top 
generals, incJuding Murdani. The shi.!'1 in 1!1e pobtlcal 
loyalties of the fifty officers create~ quite ~ stu ~d not a 
few complications. Formally speaking, retued officers of 
ABRI must join PEPABRI, the veterans' organisation, which 
is part of GOLKAR The breakaway of the fifty made the 
split within ABRI ranks a fact. . 
Although GOLKAR is still expected to wm comfortably, 
it seems the marginal parties PD/ and PPP are to be 
allowed to compete in a more evenhanded way. 
During the campaigning, Sukarno portraits will not be allowed, 
as they were in the 1987 elections. 
Old ways die hard 
While things are changing on one front, the organisation 
and management of the pemilu seems to be just as rigid and 
authoritarian as ever. Ret'd General Harl Sugiman, the 
Director-General for Social and Political Affairs at the 
Home Ministry is concurrently Secretary of the LPU, the 
Institute for General Elections. This hardline general has 
already issued several prohibitions: it is forbidden to display 
portraits of the late President Sukarno and no public rallies 
will be allowed during the campaign. His superior, GeneraJ 
Rudini, the Home Minister, has also come with some 
strange remarks, directed at. provincial governors. In bis 
capacity as the KORPRI leader, he has told them he will 
punish governors who do not achieve the targeted amount 
of votes for GOL:KAR, but as Home Minister he will be 
neutral. For government officials who want to keep their 
jobs, Rudini's words are not very reassuring. · * 
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Council of Europe: Arms embargo for Indonesia! 
The Parliamentary A,ssembly of the Council of Europe, at a meeting of its Standing Committee in 
Helsinki on 28th June 1991, unanimously adopted an unprecedented resolution on East Timor, calling 
for· an embargb against Indonesia. The Council .of Europe includes virtually all the countries of Europe, 
excluding some East European countries. Hungary is already a member and others are in the process 
ofjoin;,,ig. The. text of the resolutiqp Js as follows: 
1. East Timor was annexed by Indonesia on 17 July 1976 
with total disregard for the rules of international law and 
the rights and obligations of Portugal, which was the 
governing power.·· The annexation was accompanied by 
vario~ violations of human rights and a policy of forcible 
assimilation. 
2. The annexation has been condemned not only by the 
General Assembly and Security Council of the United 
Nations but also by the Conference of Non-Aligned 
Co11ntries, the Inter-parliamentary Union, the European 
Parliament, the ACP-EEC* Joint Assembly and many othe1 
international, padiamentary, political and religious 
organisationsi · 
3. ' From the outset the Indonesian occupying forces were 
involved · in violent confrontation with an armed Timor 
resistance movement which has always had the support of 
the East Timorese people and in recent years more 
particularly of the young. 
4. The Assemt>ly condemns the annexation .of East Timor 
by Indonesia, which it regards as a violation of international 
law and more particularly. of peoples' right to self-
determination and independence. 
5. It likewise condemns the continual grave violations c;>f 
human rights which the Indonesian occupying forces have 
inflicted .on the people . of ·East Timor · and· it affirms the 
right . of the Timorese people to decide their own political 
destiny' and preserve, develop and assert th~ir ~ult~ral, 
linguistic and religious· identity. 
6. It point$ out that Portugal, which is the governing po\Vet. 
recognised by the United Nations General Assembly, is 
morally and legally obliged to "ptomote and guarantee the 
rights of the people of Timor to· self-determination and 
independencef' (Article 297 of the Portuguese constitution) 
and supports Portugal's many representations in this matter 
since 1975. ' 
7. It endorses .the mediation endeavours of the Secretary 
General of the United Nations and encourages 
parliamentary and other initiatives aimed at enforcing the 
United Nations resolutions. · 
8. The Assembly demands that the Indonesian government: 
i. ends all violation of international instruments 
establishing human rights and people's right to self-
determination and independence; · 
ii. opens East Timor's borders and allows international aid 
and human rights organisations, starting with the Red Cross, , 
. . ' 
to carry on their work ~here; 
iii. orders an immediate cease-fire . with the Timor 
resistance forces, withdraws its armed forces from East 
Timor and creates the political preconditions for free 
exercise of self-determination. 
9. Lastly, the Assembly call~ on Council of Europe 
member states to: 
i. insist upon a political solution negotiated within the 
United Nations and involving Portugal, Indonesia and the 
East Timorese people; 
ii. urge countries which have economic links with 
Indonesia to bring pressure to bear on Indonesia to halt all 
violation of human rights and all appropriation of East 
Timor's natural resources and assets; 
iii. support food and health aid to the East Timorese people; 
iv. implement an arms embargo in respect of Indonesia 
until the objectives set out in paragraph 8 have been 
achieved. · .1f. 
* ACP-EEC: Africa-Caribbean-Pacific/European 
Economic Community. 
* * * * * 
Europe's Greens also want arms embargo 
A meeting of the European Greens held in Zurich on 1-2 
June adopted a proposal submitted by the Portuguese 
Ecology, Party Jor action to demitnd an emb~go on all arms 
sales to Indonesia, because of its invasion and illegal 
occupation of East Timor. The resolution reads: 
Considering the dramatic situation that continues to 
prevail in East Timor and the genocide that has taken place 
there since the Indonesian invasion, 
And considering the ~eed ·Of the Maubere people, 
pa,rticularly at the present time, for solidarity and 
understanding from the international community, we 
propose to launch a campaign on behalf ()/the Greens in 
Europe and worldwide at all possible levels, towards 
Parliaments and Community institutions, for. a halt tQ all 
the sales. of arms to Indonesia. .lfl 
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Timorese soccer players defect in Australia 
Four East Timorese soccer players defected while in Darwin fo~ th~. Arafura Sports Festival. Two 
reached the Portuguese Embassy in Canberra and soon le~for Lisbon; the other two have asked for 
asylum in Australia. 
Joao Pedro Ribeiro, 24, and Julio Goncalves do Rego, 
26, were the first to escape from the twenty security 
minders accompanying the soccer team on 27 May. With 
the help of East Timorese in Darwin, they reached the 
airport, bought tickets to Canberra and reached the safety of 
the Portuguese Embassy within hours .. At a press confer-
ence, they said they had taken part in peaceful demonstra-
tions .in Dili, were on a blacklist and feared for their safety. 
They had only been allowed to go to Darwin because of 
their sporting skills. 
The other two defectors, Francisco Lam, 19, and 
Francisco da Gama, 36, captain of the team, went missing 
shortly after the first two left Darwin, and turned up at the 
local immigration office to ask for asylum. 
The defections drew much media attention in Australia 
and came as a great shock to the Indonesian authorities. 
Ribeiro, the goal-keeper of the team, and do Rego, who has 
been described as Timor's star mid-field player, told a press 
conference in Canberra that they had decided to leave 
because they knew they were both on a security blacklist in 
Dili as they had participated in demonstrations. They had 
been allowed to leave only because of their sporting skills 
and the assumption that security-minders could keep 
control. 
The two men said they had decided to defect before 
leaving Dili but their relatives at home knew nothing at all. 
They told of torture, killings and the disappea(ance of 
Timorese who challenge Indonesian rule. 
I couldn't go back to Dili. We live in constant fear. It is 
the law of the jungle there and they (the Indonesians) are 
the ones with the guns.... There is constant bashing and 
harassment from the military. I myself have been bashed. It 
happens all the time. After 6 o'clock, we are all too scared 
to go out because of military patrol'S. 
The defections were made possible thanks to the well-
organised support of the East Timorese community in 
Darwin. Local Timorese met them at Darwin airport and 
bought them tickets for the journey to Canberra via Sydney. 
Remarkably, after the first two had disappeared, the next 
two were also able to make ·off. 
Emotional stress 
When the remaining eleven team members made their way 
by bus to Darwin airport to return to Dili, there were 
dozens of loca.l Timorese at the airport, urging them to 
defect as well. When they reached the airport, the men 
remained in the bus for more than half an hour. Photos 
published in the Australian press show the men, in the bus, 
in a state of anguish• boh:tering ·on hysteria as they faced the 
dilemma of dedding what to"do. 
In the airport, they were taken to a conference room and 
allowed to speak freely to the Fretilin representative in 
Joao Pedro Ribeiro (left) and Julio Goncalves do Rego after 
defecting. 
Darwin, Alfredo Fereira, an Australian lawyer, immigration 
officers and an official from the Portuguese embassy in 
Canberra; they all decided to return home. Alfreda Fereira 
said afterwards: "Their families are there and it is their 
country." 
Stunned Indonesians 
The incident was widely reported in the Indonesian press. 
Sportsmen or women defecting used to come from the 
Soviet Union, China or Eastern Europe before the political 
changes there, so defections from Indonesia made sensa-
tional reading. 
Reactions from senior officials were diverse and some-
times even contradictory. The Indonesian consul in Darwin 
described the affair as 'an embarrassment' for Indonesia. 
"It's up to the people in Jakarta whether there will be future 
visits like this. It will only disturb good relations between 
Indonesia and Australia." 
Governor Carrascalao suggested it might have something 
to do with financial difficulties or worries about unemploy-
ment. fu facf,, the soccer-team is owned by Bank Summa 
and the members ryceive Rp. 120,000 a month plus a bonus 
for. matches as well as having other jobs. Da Gama, for 
example, works for the provincial administration· in Dili. 
While Foreign Minister Ali Alatas shrugged it off as 'a 
joke' [w,hich is what ~e called the MPs meeting with UN ~ 
Sec;retary-Qeneral Peres de Cuellar in March], General Try 
Sutrisno, arme.d forces commander-in-chief, said it's not a 
'defection'. "Just call it a family reunion." MP Theo Sam-
buaga bla~ed it all on the Portuguese. 
Vice'.""Preside~t Sud~a~ono took the affair seriously 
enough to order the M1mster of Sports, Akbar Tarljung; to' 
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carry out an inquiry. Akbar Tanj1¥lg. h-lf, .. in. the .pot 
seat, as it were, could only say: "We were taken eompletely 
by surprise. We never imagined . !hat such a t.f!ing . would 
happen." . , . . . , 
Latel', Suarq, Pembar.uan ptJblished a lengt])y. account. of 
what happened, acc1JSing the Timorese in D~in. of using 
terror .to. Jllake the sportsmen .defect. Interestingly enough,. 
their only source was Harry Silalahi, one of the team 
managers; not a ~iogle Jeturni'1g. soccer-player was asked 
to ~Y anything. · · · · · 
Meanwhije, the four defectors have asked the. International 
Red Cross and Amnesty International to press for protection 
for their relatives against the possibility of retliations. • 
Seven arrested in Baucau 
Five men and two women were arrested in Baucau on 13 
July in a round-up by red-beret commandos aimed at 
discovering people in contact with the guerrilla movement. 
Four of the men are members of the Civil Guard's 'saka 
team'(this probably stands for kesatuan keamanan, or 
security unit). These arrests followed six weeks after a 
guerrilla named Celestino was. captured and heavily 
tortured to force him to divulge·. the names of clandestine 
contacts in Baucau. 
The seven detainees, who are still in army detention are: 
Mau Dolar Gama, 25 years, married, from Saelari-
Baucau, member of Saka. 
Dominggas Gama, 23 years, the wife of Mau Dolar. 
Fernando Alin, 25 years, from· Saelari-Baucau, fomerJy 
fought with Falintil in the bush. 
Juliao Haekoni, 26 years, a native of Baguia, also a 
member of Saka. 
Anita Gama, 28 years, from Saelari-Baucau; her 
husband is fighting in the bush. 
Juliao Wakala, 26 years, from Saelari-Baucau, a 
member of Saka. 
Manuel Ximenes Pereira, 25 years, from Soba village, 
Laga, a member Saka. 
All seven were tortured for information about persons in 
contact with the guerrillas. 
In Dili, a teacher named Constantine Pinto who was 
arrested in January 1991, then released, and Nuno Corvelho 
(previously arrested in July .1989) are on the run. 
Japanese MPs barred from East Timor 
Four Japanese MPs who applied for 'permission in June to 
visit East Timor for three days in July have had their 
request . turned down. At rmt., a message was conveyed 
informally by the Japanese Foreign Minister to the MPs that 
it takes six months to prepare for a visit to the territory. A 
few days later, they received a letter from the Indonesian 
Charge d'Affaires in Tokyo, flatly rejecting the request. 
The confusion was compounded when a spokesperson of 
the Department of Foreign Affairs in .Jakarta, commenting 
on a Jakarta Post report that the request had been turned 
down, denied that the Department had received any request 
for a visit by Japanese MPs. A few days later, Jakarta's 
position changed again. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas was 
quoted as ·saying that the request was ''.under consideration". 
The four MPs are members of the 91-strong Diet Forum 
on East Timor. They made the application to the Indonesian 
embassy in Tokyo and asked the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
for help. The MPs are Satsuki Eda of the United Social 
Democratic League, two Diet members from the Socialist 
Party and one from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. 
In his letter to the Indonesian ambassador, Satsuki Eda 
said the purpose of the Diet Forum on East Timor is "to 
gather and analyse accurate information on the situation in 
East Timor and study the role which Japan should 1>lay 
towards the achievement of a comprehensive solution to the 
question". The group was planning to meet the governor, 
the military commander, International Red. Cross officials, 
the CathoJic bishop and others. It would have been the first 
ever visit to East Timor by a group of Japanese MPs. 
At the first stage of the saga, assistant to Satsuki Eda 
Kiyoko Furusawa said of the need for six months' notice: 
"This is not satisfactory. We thought one month would be 
enough time. The Indonesian government said that East 
Timor was open (but) it does not want a visit at this time. 
The group now plans to go in July 1992." [Reuter, 5 July 
1991) • 
=--=--=-" =-=-=--=-=-=-~-~=-=-=~~-==----
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The Jetter from the Charge d'Affaires gave a rehash of the 
Indonesian claim that East Timor had been integrated 
according to UN resolutions on self-determination and said: 
As you know, the Japanese Government firmly recognises 
&st Timor's incorporation into the Republic of Indonesia 
and also supports UN proposals for a settlement. 
On this basis, the Indonesian Government sees no need 
for a visit to Indonesia/East Timor by you and your group. 
In order to add to your information, we invite you to read 
and examine honestly the docwnents we sent you a while 
ago. 
The claim that the Japanese Government recognises East 
Timor's incorporation by Indonesia is not correct. For 
instance, the Japanese Government's advises publishers, 
when consulted, that a boundary should be shown between 
West and East Timor in maps because the status of East 
Timor is still undecided. 
Xanana's family haraMed 
On 31 May, Indonesian army intelligence officers forced 
their way into the house of the parents of Xanana Gusmao, 
in the district of Vila Verde, Dili, in an attempt to discover 
the whereabouts of the leader of the East Timor armed 
resistance. 
It was part of an army operation to intimidate the family 
of Xanana Gusmao, after the authorities discov~red that the 
leader of the resistance secretly visited Dili in· March and 
April [see opposite page]. 
After dark, army agents in civilian clothing pulled up in 
a vehicle with no numberplate, forced their way into the 
home of Xanana's parents and threatened to rape his sister, 
35-year old Manuela Gusmao. They were taking her out of 
the house when a group of Timorese, alerted by her 
screams, freed her from the clutches of the soldiers. The 
agents tried to force her to say where her brother was; when 
she refused they threatened to take her away for 
interrogation. [Expresso, 8 June 1991) • 
Timorese youth being transferred to Java 
In a move to defuse political tensions in East Timor, in 
time for the forthcoming visit of Portuguese parliamen-
tarians, hundreds of unemployed Timorese have been 
moved to Java and placed in low-paying jobs. The scheme 
is being encouraged by the military on the assumption that 
rebelliousness among young East Timorese is caused by 
unemployment and dissatisfaction with their Jot. The 
Portuguese parliamentary mission is likely to visit East 
Timor before the end of the year. 
The scheme is being run by Yayasan Tiara, a new 
foundation set up by Suharto's oldest daughter, 'Tutut' 
Hardiyanti Rukmana, an ambitious businesswoman with her 
finger in many business pies. Francisco Kalbuadi, chair of 
the foundation, first visited East Timor to discuss the 
scheme last October, when the security forces were clamp-
ing down hard on students, school-pupils and other young 
Timorese. [Sunday Te"itorian, 26/5/1991] Tutut's recruit-
ment drive has the approval of BAIS, the Strategic Intelli-
gence Agency, which is keen to reduce the political 
pressure in East Timor. 
Yayasan Tiara offered its 'trainee' recruits a period of 
training and a job in Batam industrial complex at Rp 
300,000 a month. The first group of 132 Timorese who 
accepted the offer soon discovered that 'training' meant a 
two-week indoctrination course under the psychologist, 
Kak Seto. Over 70 were then transported to Bawen in 
Semarang district, Central Java, put to work at the PT 
Kanindotex textile factory and paid only Rp. 70,000 (about 
£30) a month. After deductions for food, lodging . and 
transport, they receive only Rp. 11,000. Others were given 
jobs with similar conditions in Bandung, Bogor, Jakarta and 
Salatiga. 
Clashes and arrests 
Already in two places, tensions have flared up between 
local workers and the Timorese. In Semarang, the Timorese 
were accused of being ungrateful for the 'special facilities' 
they were given. Fighting broke out on 18 May; the local 
army and police intervened, threatening the Timorese with 
firearms. The next day, four Timorese went to Jakarta to 
complain to Yayasan Tiara but got no response. They went 
to Salatiga for help from the Timorese student organis.tion, 
IMPETIIM which wrote on their behalf to Kanindotex chief 
executive, Robby Tjahyadi, again with no results. 
Meanwhile in Bandung, 12 'trainees' were placed in a 
textile factory. Here too tensions flared when local people 
alleged the Timorese were getting special treat~ent but 
were ungrateful. Clashes ~roke out which led to police 
intervention. Two Timorese,, Egas Jose Quintas and 
Francisco da Cunha, both 18-20 years, were arrested on 
22}une, after police made several visits to the hostel where 
they were staying. They were taken to Sumedang Prison 
and are believed to be still in custody there. The father of 
Egas was killed by the Indonesian armed forces and his 
mother who lives in Viqueque has often been abused l>y 
soldiers. 
Besides Yayasan Tiara, another bu~iness, Bukaka Elec-
tronics, owned by a successful newcomer to the Jakarta 
business world, Fadel Mohamad, has also started to recruit 
young Timorese. Fadel visited East Timor along with 
General Try Sutrisno for the army's Lebaran festivities in 
June this year. It may be that he is interested in employing 
Timorese who have completed training at an advanced 
technology school in Fatumaca.who, despite their skills, fail 
to find jobs in East Timor1 It is understood that Bukaka 
Electronics has already taken more than a hundred young 
Timorese to Jakarta. ~ 
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For a just peace in the 1990s 
A new campaign for peace talks in East Timor has been 
launched in·. Australia to draw attention to the continuing 
conflict in East Timor and the need for a lasting settlement. 
The campaign is calling for a ceasefire and talks between 
the East Timorese and Indonesia to resolve the conflict. 
Last November, the leader of the East Timorese resistance, 
Xanana Gusmao, called for · a ceasefire and offered to 
participate in talks 'without preconditions', under the 
auspices of the United Nations. He called on the Australian 
government to intercede with the Indonesian authorities to 
press for talks, but the request was flatly rejected . by 
Australia's Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans who was 
in Indonesia at the time, discussing details for implementing 
the Timor Gap Treaty. 
The talks initiative is moderate and constructive and has 
the potential to gain support from a wide cross section of 
the international community, as well as some sections of 
Indonesian society where concern about East Timor has 
grown in recent times. 
In a 16~page document entitled, East Timor, for a Jwt 
Peace in the 1990s, published by ACFOA, the Australian 
Council for Overseas Aid;· it is argued that many interna-
tional factors now work in East Timor's favour. Portugal is 
successfully pressing the issue within the European Com-
munity, concern about East Timor within the Japanese Diet 
and the US Congress is gaining strength, and the crisis. of 
communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe means 
Indonesia can no longer justify its presence in East Timor 
on security or political grounds, if ever such grounds 
existed. 
Many circles feel that it's now East Timor's tum, that 
following the Gulf crisis, independence in Namibia, plans 
for a UN-supervised referendum in the Western Sahara and 
Eritrea's advance to independent statehood, the UN should 
tum its attention to East Timor. 
For copies of the · booklet, East Timor: Towards a Jwt 
Peace in the 1990s, write to: ACFOA Human Rights 
Office, 124 Napier St, Fitzroy 3065 Australia Tel. (03) 417 
7505 Fax (03) 416 2746 ~ 
,; .. :-~:·· ... 
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Two PKI tapols released 3 years late 
Two Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) political prisoners, 
Rewang and Martosuwandi, were unexpectedly released on 
24 July from Cipinang Prison, Jakarta. Rewang should have 
been released in January 1988. Persistent efforts by his wife 
to secure his release, assisted by the Legal Aid Institute in 
Jakarta, were unsuccessful. Martosuwandi's release was also 
several years overdue. 
Another prisoner, Police Brig.General Sutarto, former 
head of the Central Intelligence Agency, BPI, whose release 
was also due in f988 · but ·who was not freed, went mad 
soon afterwards. · 
Rewang was given a life sentence in December 1971. The 
sentence was upheld on appeal in June 1975. However, ~n 
17 August 1985 his sentence was commute~ t~ 20 years 
and he was twice granted three-months' rem1ss10n, on 17 
August 1986 and on 17 August 1987. [Remission would not 
have been possible on a life sentence.] This meant that his 
release was due in January 1988. 
After numerous inquiries including a fruitless approach to 
the Vice-President, his wife was informed by the Justice 
Department in February this year that, since the prisoner 
had not asked for clemency from the President, it was not 
possible for his life sentence to have been commuted to 
twenty years. 
That seemed to be the end of the matter till her ... husband 
was released on 24 July. 
Subandrio and Omar Dhani to follow? 
Justice Department circles in Jakarta are quoted as saying 
former Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Subandrio, and former 
Air Force commander, Air Marshal Omar Dhani, both 
serving; life sentences, may soon be released as well. Both 
had death sentences which were commuted to life following 
clemency pleas to Suharto. 
One prisoner whose name has not been mentioned for 
release is Colonel Latief, one of the army conspirators 
involved in the 1 October 1965 kidnap and murder of 
senior army generals. Latief had for many years been a 
subordinate of Suharto; during his trial, he said he informed 
Suharto of the kidnap plans just a few hours earlier. Unlike 
his co-conspirators, Untung and Supardjo who were 
sentenced to death and executed many years ago, Latief was 
given a life sentence. ~ 
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Aid and human rights in Indonesia 
Should aid to Indonesia be made conditional on human rights? This issue is argued out each year 
between NGOs and governments around the time of the annual meeting of the Inter-Governmental 
Group on Indonesia (JGGJ), the club of Indonesia~ main creditors. Despite signs of a changing attitude 
in other international fora - such as the EC - JGGI remains resolute. This year, the Group, whose 
lending is dominated by the World Bank and the Japanese governmen~ promised a record $4. 75 billion 
- with not a whisper of human rights. Below, we outline the state of the conditionality debate. 
Indonesia is popular with its donors. It is a good debtor, 
obediently keeping up with debt-servicing payments, 
deregulating the economy in line with ·World Bank and 
IMF demands and welcoming the kind of large-scale, 
capital intensive 'development' projects - dams, roads, 
power stations - the donor nations (and their ,engineering 
and service industries) prefer. Given these favourable 
circumstances, governments. tend · to brush off arguments 
that development aid should be linked to respect for human 
rights and democratisation. 
The British Government, for example, has shied away 
from discussing human rights conditionality - indeed its 
much-condemned refusal to impose trade sanctions against 
the South African government is a measure of its aversion 
to link human rights and investment, trade or aid, where 
the partner is what Britain considers a 'friendly country'. 
The UK prefers instead to have a discreet word with 
Indonesian officials, when abuses can no longer be ignored. 
Thus, in reply to a Jetter from TAPOL which urged the 
Foreign Secretary to raise the question of East Timor and 
West Papua at the 1990 IGGI meeting, Foreign Office 
Minister Tim Sainsbury said: "You will wish to know that 
our delegate at the IGGI made representations to the 
Indonesians in the margins of the meeting." [See TAPOL 
Bulletin 100, August 1990) 
One of the few attempts by a government minister to 
make a direct link between aid· and human rights came ·in 
1990 when Dutch Overseas Development CO-operation 
Minister and IGGI Chair, Jan Pronk postponed the signing 
of a US $13 million bilateral special· assistance agreement 
in protest over the execution in February 1990 of four 
long-term political prisoners and the imminent execution 
of six more. The action, combined with diplomatic pressure 
from other European governments, halted the executions, 
but without guarantees that they would not take place at a 
later date. Minimal though·. the sanction was, Pronk's 
commitment to linking aid to ·human rights was warmly 
welcomed by NGOs both in Indonesia and abroad. The 
i.$ue also sparked a row in the Dutch parliament between 
those who backed Pronk's position, and the Dutch Foreign 
Minister, Hans van den Broek, who is known to favour the 
conventional approach of 'silent diplomacy'. 
Pronk's March 1990 visit to Jakarta as IGGI Chair saw 
unprecedented meetings with human rights activists, 
including members of the newly-formed Indonesian Front 
for the Defence of Human Rights [INFIGHT]. But expec-
tations raised .. by Pronk that these discussions would 
continue at the IGGI meeting in June last year came to 
nothieg. Instead it was 'business as usual', with Indonesia 
getting more aid than ever. The van den Brock approach 
gained the upper hand; the Dutch cabinet decided that 
human rights should fall under the remit of the Foreign 
Minister, not the ODA. 
When Jan Pronk visited Jakarta this year, and was again 
pressed by students and NGOs to link aid to greater 
democracy and respect for human rights, there was less 
faith in his ability to influence the IGGI. Pronk said as 
much himself when he urged Indonesian activists to direct 
their protests to the foreign ministers of IGGI nations, since 
he was 'only the chair'. 
Pronk did at least manage to raise the issue of social 
justice in discussions on the economy with the government 
in Jakarta. He called for restraint on the expansion of the 
private sector as it might threaten the environment and 
cause injustice and exploitation of labour. He wanted to see 
stronger, independent labour unions, more participation of 
the people in development and a policy of "economic 
democracy" to reduce growing inequality between rich and 
poor. [Jakarta Post May 18, 1991] 
The Pronk approach has not been adopted by IGGI as a 
whole. It can be argued that for the time being, the advo-
cates of silent diplomacy have won and attempts to get 
human rights on the IGGI agenda will fail. Most aid 
agreements are hammered out before IGGI meetings in 
bilateral negotiations between Indonesia and individual 
~ 
lhe high-profile· Ali Alatas is one of the many candidates pr the 
post of the UN Secretary-General. 
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donors, leaving the June meetings with little more function 
than a rubber stamp. Logically, it is during these bilateral 
negotiations, that efforts to raise human rights should be 
concentrated. But with more flexibility on the issue of 
linkage emerging in other fora, the double standards of 
IGGl's position must also be challenged. 
~essments from the UNDP 
One of the IGGI donors is the United Nations Development 
Programme, which in its 1991 Human Development Report, 
argues for a different strategy than that adopted by IGGI. 
Its main conclusion is that for development, conventional 
economics isn't enough: "Lack of political commitment, 
rather than Jack of financial resources, is usually the real 
cause of neglect". It suggests that 
external development partners can often raise sensitive 
political issues, such as those surrounding land reform or 
military expenditure .. [p.9] " ,· 
The report states however, that direct linkage of aid to 
policy ·reform including social objectives and political 
freedom "is a controversial matter," and favours directing 
social priority aid to countries which "support human 
development, signalling unobtrusively to everyone the 
conditions for receiving aid." [p.76] 
Winds of change in Brussels? 
Controversial or not, European foreign ministers decided to 
raise democratisation and human rights in their meeting 
with ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] 
foreign ministers in May. Luxembourg's Jacques Poos 
warned that the EC was ready to "incorporate respect for 
human rights and the promotion of democracy" into its 
links with Asia. Economic means must go hand-in-hand 
with political democracy .and military means should not be 
used to solve political problems, he said. Democracy and 
human rights are . "not only a quest~on of legitimacy but 
also the · ·most appropriate means of achieving sound 
economic development". 
But the EC ministers stopped short of directly linking 
human· rights and democracy to aid, stressing instead a 
"constructive approach", with the emphasis on "encourag-
ing" countries which move towards democracy and careful-
ly avoiding "interference" in third countries. They are 
committed however, to introduce a tough human rights 
clause, and reference to environmental protection in the 
revised cooperation agreement with ASEAN. 
Non-ASEAN Burma, however, received different treat-
ment. The EC ministers called on their ASEAN counter-
parts to join international attempts, using sanctions and 
embargoes if necessary, to persuade Burma's military rulers 
to hand over power to elected representatives. [FEER 
20/6/91] 
Any linkage of human rights to aid - however much it is 
watered down - is always interpreted as interference and 
therefore is always unpalatable for ASEAN. ''.I,.et me ... stress 
that ASEAN countries accept and recognise fundamental 
freedoms but with respect to their implementation, we 
believe national jurisdiction should prevail," said 
Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas. [Indonesian News 
July 1, 1991] 
ASEAN's response may also have been fuelled by the 
fear that the EC response to Burma might one day be 
applied to their own governments. 
The 'interference argument' is typically accompanied by 
the accusation that the West is attempting to apply foreign 
values to Asia and by stressing a difference in the interpre-
tation of human rights. Alatas said the Western concept of 
human rights was too narrow, being limited largely to civil 
and political rights, whilst ignoring economic and social 
rights, such as .freedom from hunger. ASEAN countries 
could not be judged by the same standards as the West 
while they were still overcoming the blight of colonialism, 
he said. 
In other words, the EC ministers' overtures were flatly 
rejected by their ASEAN counterparts. They also made it 
clear well in advance that they would not be giving any 
ground when the matter was raised at the July meeting with 
EC ministers in Kuala Lumpur, this time stressing that 
economic and social rights "should override . individual 
rights as perceived in Western eyes." 
The EC-ASEAN clash is manifest in the omission of any 
reference to human rights in the final joint statement .issued 
after the May meeting. The crumbling of the EC ministers' 
,position before ASEAN and the bland statement was 
condemned by human rights organisations including 
TAPOL. 
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Overlapping arguments 
There is. an interesting overlap between the views. of Third 
World governments and those of Southern activists. 
Writing in Third Wor:ld Resurgence, the. joµrnal of·· the 
Malaysia-based NGO, Third World Network, Chandra 
Muzaffar criticises the UNDP's Human Freedom Index on 
similar grounds. "How ca~ a human freedom index fgnore 
freedoms - such as the freedom from hunger - which aie 
fundamental to the very survival of the human being?" 
[Third World Resurgence 11]. 
Muzaffar too, pomts out the failure to inclu<le freedom of 
peoples and nations "which millions and millions of people 
in Asia and Africa struggled for during the long decades". 
If this freedom had been. taken . into account, he argues, 
Hong Kong would not have ranked so high on the scale. 
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Collective freedom should be included because it "has a 
direct bearing upon the individual citizen's ability to shape 
the political future of his society." 
The denial of the right to collective freedom by one 
people of another is also discussed, illustrated by the 
example of Israel and the Palestinians. "It looks as if the 
UNDP's Human Freedom Index gave maximum weightage 
to Israel's observance of human rights and political liberties 
vis-a-vis its own Jewish population and ignored or played 
down its gross violations of the basic freedoms of the 
Palestinians, as individuals and as a community". 
Smokescreen 
If there is overlap in what the NGOs and the governments 
of the ASEAN region say, there is a world of difference 
between their motives, however. The NGOs are fighting 
against human rights abuses and in doing so, expose the 
role played by Northern governments in perpetuating these 
abuses. Governments such as the Suharto regime use the 
same arguments as a smokescreen behind which they 
continue to deny basic human rights to their own people. 
Moreover, it is not only the human rights within the 
Northern definition - the political and civil - that are 
abused, but also the very rights within the Southern 
interpretation that Indonesia says must be recognised. Thus 
Alatas is hoist by his own petard when he says: 
the rights of the individual are balanced by the righ.ts of 
the community, in other words, balanced by the obligation 
equally to respect the rights of others, the rights of the 
society and the rights of the nation". [Indonesian ·News, 
July 1, 1991] 
What about the collective rights of the East Timorese 
people? How many of their collective rights are 
recognised? Indonesia has ruthlessly denied the rights of 
their society and the rights of.their nation, by invading and 
annexing their country. The famine which followed denied 
the East Timorese their right to be freed from hunger. West 
Papuans too, have been denied their right to self-determi-
nation, the right to choose their own development and to 
benefit from their natural resources. 
If the collective rights of the East Timorese and West 
Papuans were calculated into Indonesia's ranking on the 
Human Freedom Index, like Israel, Indonesia would fmd 
itself even further down the scale. 
Valid points 
The Southern NGOs are right to expose major short-
comings in the North's interpretation of human rights or 
human freedom, as propounded by the UNDP Index. The 
arguments used both by NGOs and governments are valid. 
True, governments such as Indonesia use them for the 
worst possible reasons - to deflect criticism from the 
appalling abuse of human rights that goes on in their 
countries - but this does not mean that in themselves the 
arguments are invalid. The Human Development Report, of 
which the Index is an annex, fails to stress the role of 
Northern governments and their industries in the continuing 
denial of social and economic freedom in the South by 
their domination of a world economic system heavily 
weighted in their favour. The narrow defmition ·of human 
rights adopted by Northern governments does not include 
the sense of responsibility it should. The North's double 
standards in choosing to impose sanctions . against some 
countries and not others also needs to be exposed. Political 
and economic self-interest, not humanitarian co~ider­
ations, dictates the selection of Bµrma for special punis.11"'." 
ment for its failure to install the elected government, ~or 
example, while Thailand's military coup and the subsequent 
suppression of community organisations goes 
unreprimanded. These are the same double standards that 
Jed to US-led intervention against . Iraq, while Indonesia's 
15-year long occupation of East Timor is no longer even 
condemned, let alone acted upon. 
In this context, people are quite right in asking: what 
right have Northern governments to link human rights to 
aid when the world's economic and political syste~ is 
skewed in their favour? For if the economic system were 
more equitably balanced, the South would not need the 
North's 'aid'. 
The answer lies in the fact that Northern economic 
domination is maintained in part by the co-opting of elites 
in the South, who stand to gain politically and personally 
from .development aid which flows· their way .. Therefore, 
for the opposition in countries with oppressive regimes 
such as Indonesia, demanding human rights linkage to aid 
may be one of the most effective means of exposing abuses 
with a view to influencing government policies. This 
pragmatic approach is the one adopted by the opposition in 
Indonesia and this is why TAPOL calls fq,r,aid to .be made 
dependent on human rights. . · ~ 
From the editors: We would welcome comments from our 
readers on this important and controversial topi,c. 
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Staged rallies as killings continue 
Despite ,claims. by the authorities that the situation in Aceh is now under control and attempts to rally 
the J?OfiUlation·· in . the government~· support, reports of human rights violations and armed clashes 
continue to reach the outside world. More,Jcehnes(! refugees continue to flee to Malaysia and 
documented cases of disappearances have been made public. As the 1992 elections approach, the 
authorities desperately need to restore some degree of nortn'1llity in Aceh. · 
t. 
Rudini visits Aceh 
A report about mass killings in NRCHandelsblad, a Reuter 
report of public executions and a damning report about 
Aceh in Los Angeles Times have focused international 
attention on the situation in Aceh. The government has had 
to launch a counter offensive for the benefit of world 
opinion. The centrepiece of the offensive was a visit to 
Aceh by Minister of the Interior,· ret'd General Rudini in 
July, with a party of fifteen journalists and many officials. 
The group visited North Aceh, East Aceh and Aceh Pidie 
where units of GAM [ Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or Free 
Aceh Movement] have been most active. Everywhere they 
went, they attended well-organised rallies attended by 
thousands of Acehnese armed with bamboo spears and 
holding aloft pro-government posters and banners swearing 
to exterminate the rebels. Everywhere, Rudini received 
reports from local officials, asserting that the situation is 
now back to normal. Everywhere the emphasis was on how 
the people are standing shoulder to shoulder with the army 
to crush the rebels. 
Indonesian journalists who joined in Rudini's 'safari' were 
hardly likely to carry out independent investigations of the 
true situation. But even so, the reports that have appeared 
do not hide the crude stage-management of the trip. 
In many parts of Aceh, villagers have been required to set 
up so-called Unit Ksatria Penegak Pancasila (Units of 
Warriors of Pancasila Upholders). The Indonesian army 
think they can persuade people to believe that these para-
military units have been set up on the initiative of the 
people but Ksatria is a sanskrit term familiar to the 
' . 
Ihe Bukit MaTtajam camp in Maklysia, a police /o~k-up for 140 
Acehnese refugees. 
Javanese and alien to the Acehnese. Every village must 
supply 10-20 youngsters for rigorous training for eight 
hours a day. The military commander of Aceh Utara, 
Lt.Colonel Budi Triarso, proudly boasted to journalists that 
these Acebnese youngsters had been taught to sing 
Indonesian nationalistic songs, "to make the Acebnese 
youth more conscious of their own national heritage". 
District commander Colonel Syarwan Hamid told the 
minister and the journalists that since May, the cooperation 
between the armed forces and the population resulted in the 
capture of 300 Aceh rebels, He estimates that only· 50 
rebels are still fighting in the mountains of Aceh. 
The army has also created another paramilitary force, 
Rakyat Terlatih (Trained Peoples' Units) or Ratih for short. 
Ratih is part of the "armed forces total defence concept", 
where people in the villages are actively involved in 
hunting down rebel forces. No fewer than 60,000 villagers 
have been recruited for ratih training. Both fu Aceh and 
East Timor, where armed insurrection enjoys great support 
of the villagers, the army has resorted to using the ratih 
concept in an attempt to sever comnumications between the 
guerillas and the people and isolate the rebels. 
More tough talk from Pramono 
The regional military commander, Major-General Djoko 
Pramono, last November proclaimed that he had told 
people: "If you see a GPK, you should kill him. There's no 
need to investigate. Just shoofhim or knife him." [Tempo, 
17 November 1990],, Now, as Rudini sought to assuage 
public opinion about conditions in Aceh, Pramono spoke at 
some length about the operations under way since he 
became commander in June last year. 
They are urban guerrillas; they are everywhere and live 
together with the people. In the street stalls,. in the markets, 
in the kampungs, that's where you'll find the GPK [GPK = 
security disruptor gangs, the initials by which the Aceh 
Freedom Movement is officially known.] At first, it was 
difficult for us to differentiate between good people and the 
GPK The question was how to pluck out the hair without 
spoiling the flour. 
They are people who want a state separate from Indo-
nesia. That involves the national interest, so we gave it all 
we could We waged a military operation because they are 
people with a concept, with weapons and on the field, they 
have mass support [punya massa]. This means that without 
a military operation, the thing will never be finished. 
Our way o_f l'!°/ci.ng at it is the Pancasila way and the 
1945 Constitution way. We're not like them [Amnesty 
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International]. In fact, we are behaving very well. If this 
were not so, I would have murdered the lot of them. 
It's perfectly clear that they [the people in custody] are 
involved but we have our own assessment. Whether the 
involvement is slight or not slight is up to us to assess. If 
[after releasing them] we later get proof that they are 
leaders, then we'll take them into custody again. [Editor, 
13 July 1991) 
A civilian governor 
After months of speculation that the governor of Aceh 
Ibrahim Hasan, might be replaced when his term expired 
last month, he was re-appointed. During the Rudini visit, 
Ibrahim Hasan was much to the fore. The technocrat-
governor of Aceh, an ethnic Acehnese, had to campaign 
hard in 1987 to reverse GOLKAR's poor showing at the 
general election in 1982 and could only do this with 
promises of development projects. Many Acehnese have 
been disappointed and grumble: GOLKAR promised us 
development · and instead they sent us guns. Ibrahim Hasan 
will have a difficult task, winning another GOLKAR victory 
next year. Jakarta had no choice but to reappoint him. 
Giving him the sack might have been interpreted as 
blaming him for failure to keep the support of the Aceh-
nese. Ibrahim Hasan's position is not unlike that of Carras-
calao's in East Timor, a local man and a technocrat, always 
in the limelight and often frank about the central govern-
ment's failings. Yet in fact, he is little more than a figure-
head, now that armed insurrection has swept the region. · 
Ibrahim Hassan, 
governor of Aceh. 
Counter-insurgency strategy 
If official claims are to be believed, it seems that the 
army's counter-insurgency strategy which is along the lines 
of its strategy in East Timor, is bearing fruit. After two 
years of fighting, the army is now claiming that special 
commandos have captured or killed some high ranking 
GAM fighters. Hamzah and Teungku Abdul Rachman were 
ambushed in the mountains and killed with their body-
guards. On 13 July Saleh Gedong an important GAM 
commander was killed in a raid. No details were given but 
reports say he was planning to cross the Malacca Strait for 
a visit to Malaysia and to report to Hasan di Tiro, leader of 
the insurrection. 
The Acehnese boat people 
Since our last issue, more Acehnese refugees have arrived 
in Malaysia. In July, two more groups of boat people 
arrived, bringing the total to around three hundred. In the 
meantime forty Acehnese refugees who arrived in Malaysia 
earlier this year are reportedly to go on trial before a court 
in Taiping, Merak, charged with illegal entry. TAPOL 
wrote to the Malaysian High Commissioner in London to 
express the fear that if these trials go ahead and they are 
found guilty, they might face repatriation in defiance l>f the 
protection they are entitled to under the . UNHCR protocol 
on Refugees. · 
About 140 Acehnese refugees are locked up in stuffy, 
tin-roofed barracks in the police compound in Bukit Mar-
tajam on the Malaysian mainland, opposite the island of 
Penang. The large Acehnese community in Malaysia is 
providing food ~d medicines to supplement . the meagre 
rations from the Malaysian government. The situation of 
the refugees is still precarious as the Malaysian government 
will nof allow the UNHCR to meet them. 
Asia Watch report 
For the second time in six months, the US-based human 
rights organisation Asia Watch bas published a report on 
Aceh. (Indonesia: Continuing Human Rights Violations in 
Aceh, June 19, 1991.] The report concludes that summary 
executions, disappearances, torture and arbitrary arrests by 
the Indonesian army continue. After conducting an on-the-
spot investigation, Asia Watch bas produced invaluable 
information about the political trials of alleged Acehnese 
rebels with evidence of the use of torture to extract confes-
sions from prisoners. Defendants bad to sign interrogation 
depositions under duress, detainees were not allowed to see 
their families and were denied defence counsel of their own 
choice. 
The June report is the first analytical account of the 
subversion trials in Aceb and Medan. In none of the 17 
trials thus far have witnesses for the defence appeared. An 
appendix gives the names and details of 73 prisoners and 
detainees suspected of involvement in GAM. It includes 
Acehnese who have already been convicted or who have 
appeared as witnesses for the prosecution. Asia Watch 
believes that virtually all the prisoners and detainees have 
beeQ victims of torture, illegal detention or unfair trials. 
The Asia Watch report also confirms the widespread 
imposition of curfews and travel restrictions. Despite 
denials of any curfews by the Indonesian authorities, Asia 
Watch says that people violating curfews run the risk of 
arrest or even death. The curfews vary, sometimes lasting 
from 6 pm to 6 am. 
Another nasty feature of Indonesia's reign of terror in 
Aceh is the harsh action against family members of alleged 
members of GAM . The most common form of reprisal is 
arrest and Asia Watch suspects that this may be a major 
reason why villagers in East Aceh flee to Malaysia by boat. 
Disappearances 
Disappeared persons in countries like Indonesia often tum 
out to have been killed by the army. In the last TAPOL 
Bulletin, we reported a massacre on 12 September 1990 
when a truckload of 56 detainees from Rancong detention 
centre were shot with M16s and their bodies dumped in a 
ravine. In a separate report issued in July, Asia Watch 
revealed that it had obtained information from Aceh that 
eight detainees from Lhoknga prison disappeared after 
being taken from the prison by security officers. The first 
three, Yusri, Jafar and M. Yusuf were taken on 3 February 
while the oth~r five, Mahdi Yusuf, Amiruddin, Abdullah 
Ibrahim, Idris lshaq and Ibrahim Hasan were taken from 
their cells ·on 4 March 1991. They have not been seen 
since. 
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Another detainee, Syukri, was reportedly taken from his 
cell in the military detention centre in Lamlo, Pidie 
together with seven others and executed early in 1991. 
Fellow prisoners report that the eight bodies were buried in 
a mass grave on the grounds of. the . military barracks in 
LamJ . ·'.·.·. '·'· ''. ·, . 0 ~·. . 
Hundreds of Acehnese have been taken from 'their houses 
but only a few dozen are accounted for and have been put 
on trial. Some are still in prison for further interrogation 
while others have disapp~ar~d. . . 
Asia Watch issued an urgent action on behalf of the nine 
disappeared people and called on the Indonesian govern-
ment to account for the date and whereabouts of the nine 
men reported missing. The organisation aJso called for an 
investigation into allegations of torture in Acehnese prisons 
and detention centres, and urged the Indonesian govern-
ment to prosecute military or police personnel believed to 
be responsible for such torture; 
Ongoing trials 
Since June (see TAPOL Bulletin no. 105, June 1991) 
several more harsh sentences have been passed. There have 
been five more sentences, bringing the total of verdicts to 
21. 
The defendant Muhammad Thaib being taken into the 
Lhokseumawe District Court. He received a sentence of 20 years. 
Three more defendants were tried at the District Court of 
Lhokseumawe, allegedly involved in terrorist activities. 
Umaryah bin Hamzah, a civil servant, 35 years, received 
a sentence of 20 years on 19 June. The prosecution had 
demanded a life sentence. He was allegedly involved in the 
attack and burning of a truck on 20 April 1990. 
Muhammad Nazar bin Abdullah, a worker at PT KKA, 
28· years, was accused of stealing 3 kg of explosives from 
PT Kertas Kraft Aceh (paper and pulp company), to be 
used for attacks on police stations and the Arun gas 
installation. 
The prosecution demanded 20 years imprisonment and on 
29 June, he was sentenced to 14 years. 
Ibrahim Muhammad Jalil alias Ibrahim Gayo, a truek-
driver, 36 years, was accused of making an attack on an 
army sentry at PT KKA when arms were taken. He was 
sentenced to 16 years. · 
The foUowing cases were tried at the Medan District Court: 
Abdul Jalil bin Muda Sali, an itinerant photographer, 36 
years, was accused of functioning as a liaison officer ·for 
GAM between Aceh and Malaysia, attending illegal 
meetings and circulating subversive material. The prosecu-
tJoµ deijtanded .15 ye~, and on 6 July he got 10 years. 
. ,';· ' ,., ·: ·• 
Surya bin Umar, a 'food vendor, 30 years, was allegedly 
involved in smuggling weapons from Thailand into Aceh. 
On 26 June the judges passed a. verdict of 8 years after the 
prosecution demandecj. a sentence of 12 years. 
Lawyers in Indonesia agree that the trials in Aceh are a 
travesty of justice'. LBH, the Legal Af.d Institute has not 
been a]lowed to assist the defendants. The LBH director in 
Medan caJled the trials a "drama where everyone is told 
what part to play" [FEER 25 July 1991). FEER correspon-
dent Adam Schwarz wrote: 
One lawyer in ·Banda Aceh, who. helped defend three 
GPK-Aceh suspects, said the defendants told him they 
were forced to confess under torture. 'Jhey did not speak 
up in court, he said, . "because they had been told that if 
they made trouble they would be sent back to military 
facilities for further questioning. They knew this meant 
more torture. {FEER, 25 July 1991] 
Eight of the Banda Aceh verdicts went to the High Court 
for appeal. Four sentences were increased, three were cut . 
while one remained unchanged. 
The sentence of Hasbi Abdullah (brother of GAM leader, 
Dr Zaini Abdullah, in exile in Sweden) was increased from 
14 to 17 years, Mulkan Usman's sentence went up from 
12 to 15 years and Nordin Abdurrachman's from 9 to 13 
years. The latter two were involved in GAM activities in 
the 1970s and had previously been arrested. Adnan Beur-
ansyah's sentence went up from 8 to 9 y~ars. During his 
trial, Beuransyah responded to the summing up 9f the 
prosecution with a graphic account of the torture he 
experienced. His account is reproduced at length in the 
June 1991 Asia Watch report. 
Amir Syam's sentence went down from 6 to 5 years. The 
sentences of Azhar Rafsah and Marwan Yunus were 
reduced from 8 to 6 years. The 5-year sentence of the 
ninth political prisoner, Teuku Effendi, was upheld., ... 
......... · .. ··~~~f df~f~:: 
... ··• T1Je l.BH If~ tJle: autb~ties not only of.tortur-. 
·· .. ing ·:de~ineCIJ •· b"1 ·nf obifttiJcUng their ·right . t<t legal 
.. , as&isf#ce; often .there was no la\Vyer· ~vcn fQI' t~ · 
'··· ··l!J~i~~~~~!.:!•···· ·  tipt, WJ: ·· _ ltCOpters.'. hOvenng of \. 
< .. ~~ t1ie .~¢wrt saw, . . . · · . , 
: .. ·~·. + .. ~it~ · situati'_Ui 'in Acch as "~ _selbaGk ·· .. ·.· 
··:~Ol' ;~.. ts m Indoncs1' •.• ~ An LBH clICDt who 
\ ... ~~edJegat .sistance.in Febru8iy thiS :year di$ap--
··. , pe.!lfe4 aftc( thQ military had picked him . up and taken -
hint roiand : the villago-~ showing . him badly injured and 
· .... his ·· ·ri..·. (:Overed with · scratcheS; ... . NObody knows 
"A·}};hether he is 8live or dead~lf · (Reuter, 24 July 1991) 
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Muzzling the press 
Moves to challenge the powers of the Information Minister to revoke press licences, thus incre~sing 
the scope for press freedom have ended in failure, after the Minister claimed that any change in the 
present regulations would "lead to anarchy". · 
A newspaper publisher in Indonesia requires a publishing 
licence, known as a SIUPP, which is issued by the Infor-
mation Ministry. Although the Basic Press Law of 1982 
stipulates that "the national press shall not be subjected to 
bans or mu7.Zling", Information Minister Harmoko - himself 
a former journalist and newspaper proprietor - issued a 
ministerial ruling in 1984, based on the Basic Press Law, 
giving himself powers to revoke a licence if, "after hearing 
the views of the Press Council, he considers that the 
publisher of the publication in question no longer behaves 
in. a way that befits a healthy press, a press that is free and 
responsible". Everything of course hangs on the meaning of 
'responsible' and the fact that the interpretation is left 
entirely to the executive branch~ 
oompaslkom 
.. OH MASJH ! ICAMU MASIH.BERllA~ 
'H'RiTilt .• ASAA~L BE~TANi· 
6UN0 JAW .POI.iTlf PAN 
KONSTRUKTif .. M,Jil\i 
ALTERNATtP. SOPm1° Ti[ SLJP.O,T!~Ci®ANi RAS • 
TAHU DiRi.TIOAK~E~TE .-TAN~AN D!M<MN PANCASrLA. 
iiPAK iNSJNUAT;F, TIPAK 
MEN0HASUT ;TIP~ MEME • 
CAH 'ELAH. TiPAK MEN6HiHA, 
TiPAI( .... 
.. Oh of course! You can criticise ..... as k>ng as it's responsible, 
positive and constructive, gives an alternative, as long as it's 
polite, considerate of others and sensitive, as long as you know 
your place and don't go against Pancasila, as long as it's not 
tendentious, it doesn't incite, it doesn't disunite, it's not offensive, 
it doesn't .... [Kompa:s, 5 June 1991] 
The Press Council is appointed by the government with 
the Information Minister in the chair and a senior official of 
the Information Ministry as secretary-general. No wonder 
then that few people regard it as a platform for an indepen-
dent review in cases where the government decides to act 
against a newspaper by withdrawing its licence. 
Last September, the Minister-Coordinator for Political and 
Security Affairs, Sudomo, stirred some hopes by expressing 
support for an end to the 'telephone culture' (editors being 
told informally, by phone, that this or that topic should not 
be reported), proposing that the Executive's powers to 
revoke SIUPP should be 'reconsidered', and saying it was 
futile to limit or prohibit the activities of foreign journalists. 
But any hopes that things might change were dashed when 
Harmoko upheld his special SIUPP powers; a boulevard 
periodical, Monitor, has since lost its SIUPP, the 'telephone 
culture' continues undiminished and a foreign journalist has 
been blacklisted and several foreign newspapers banned 
from circulating in Indonesia because of an article analysing 
the business activities of the Suharto family. 
Reporting restrictions on Aceh events 
At present, the most sensitive issue for the Suharto regime 
is the situation in Aceh where the armed forces are perpe-
trating massacres to stamp out opposition to rule from 
Jakarta, in support of the Aceh Freedom Movement. 
Reports on these events in the national press clearly reflect 
the official handouts. A Reuter story quoting an eye-
witness who knew of five public executions in Sigli was 
rather crudely denied a few weeks later by Tempo [25 May] 
in a report that bore all the hallmarks of an official rebuttal. 
In its recent report on Aceh, Asia Watch draws attention 
to the restrictions imposed on the local press in North 
Sumatra. It quotes a Medan editor as saying: "I'm not an 
editor any more. I'm a tailor (tukang jahit); I have to take 
the information and sew it into something new." A reporter 
who investigated . reports of killings in PeUJeulak in May 
this year produced a detailed report containing several 
specific incidents of army abuses, despite military attempts 
to intimidate him. However, the printed version bore no 
relation to the original; all accounts of abuses had been 
removed "in what appears to have been self-censorship by 
the editor".·· (Asia Watch, 'Indonesia: Continuing Human 
Rights Violations in Aceh', June 1991, p. 15] 
Asia Watch also be~ieves that the sudden closure of two 
newspapers, Aceh Post and Peristiwa on ·the grounds of 
'efficiency' may in fact have been related to the army's 
attempt to control press freedom in Aceh . 
The editor of the Medan-based Waspada, Ani Idrus told 
parliamentarians that "military restrictions prevented her 
from reporting accurately on clashes between the military 
and separatist rel,>els in Aceh". [Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 21 June 1991] 
Collusion 
The latest SIUPP controversy began when several deputy 
chairmen of Parliament (DPR) publicly questioned the 
legality of the ·Minister's 1984 ruling, arguing that it 
contradicts the 1982 Basic Law which must take precedence 
over a ministerial decree. The string of statements attacking. 
the press licensing system appears to have been part of an 
attempt by parliamentarians of all three parties, to show 
some muscle, reversing the impression that they are nothing 
more than a rubber-stamp for the government. The move 
followed complaints by some MPs that the press devoted 
little space to events at the DPR as compared to coverage 
of the government's activities. 
Calls for an end to SIUPP began to reverberate in the 
media and the DPR's Commission I invited the editors of 
23 leading national and regional newspapers to furnish it 
with arguments to place before the Information Minister. 
Most of the editors, as it turns out, were not against the 
licensing system as such but only unhappy about the way 
a licence could be revoked. They argued that publishers 
should have the right to defend themselves against charges 
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of misconduct, either before the Press Council or by being 
formally charged in a court of Jaw, rather than leaving the 
matter to the arbitrary decision of the Minister. They 
wanted the criteria for licence revocation to be spelt out. 
But no-one questioned the legal requirement that newspa-
pers must behave 'responsibly'. 
In fact, established newspaper proprietors have an interest 
in preserving the SIUPP system which they see as a form 
of protection against wealthy businessmen planning to set 
up new newspapers. Goenawan Mohamad, editor of the 
weekly, Tempo, argues that the SIUPP system was born just 
as much from a desire of publishers wanting competition to 
be regulated. ''The SIUPP is therefore the product of a 
collusion of government and publishers' interests - to be 
blunt, of the owners of capital - who wanted some kind of 
protection." [Tempo, 22 June 1991] 
Harmoko in confident mood 
Information Minister Harmoko is one of the more deter-
mined and self-assured members of Suharto's cabinet, 
never flinching before a barrage of criticism, wherever it 
comes from. The bumptious confidence he always exudes 
only confirms the impression that he, perhaps more than 
most other ministers, enjoys Suharto's full backing and 
admiration. He also obviously enjoys the power he now 
exerts over people who, until his elevation to ministerial 
rank, were his professional workmates. He insists on up-
holding Suharto's dictum that the New Order is based on 
respect for the Jaw even when he issues a ministerial ruling 
which clearly contravenes the law on which it is based. In 
large part, his confidence is based on the conviction that 
Suharto has no intention of relinquishing the government's 
power to revoke press licences, as the FEER puts it, "at 
least until after the presidential election in 1993". 
But Harmoko has another card up his sleeve for on closer 
examination, the Basic Press Law is not so protective of 
press freedom as many commentators like to make out. As 
he has repeatedly reminded people throughout this contro-
versy, the Jaw stipulates in Article 19 that: 
Press publications must be safeguarded against every 
possibility of being utilised by anyone for purposes that 
jeopardise state security, publ~c order or national interests, 
or are harmful to society or disrupt the growth and devel-
opment of a free and responsible national press, for 
instance, by disseminating the teachings of Commu-
nism/Marxism/Leninism, or with writings that harm the 
nation's morals, harm national integrity or incite discord 
between different ethnic groups, religions, races or groups. 
Those who argue against the SIUPP system have a very 
flimsy case. No-one challenges this fundamental principle 
contained in the Press Law. Confronted ·by the iron logic of 
New Order political control, it is not surprising that the case 
against SIUPP finally collapsed. The DPR Commission's 
meeting with Harmoko which had been billed as the 
occasion for parliamentarians, backed by demands from the 
editors, t~ press for change in the system of press control, 
ended in an agreement that SIUPP "is still relevant in order 
to guide a healthy, free and responsible press". Any new 
ideas about SIUPP should be channelled to the Press 
Council where they will be considered and passed on to the 
Information Minister (its chairman!) for his consideration. 
Harmoko said that · his powers to revoke licences are for the 
purpose of guiding the press, not banning newspapers. The 
press has nothing to fear. As long as they abide by the 
· .. ENSORSHIP 
··dE:.:·· 
regulations and refrain from engaging in liberal practices, 
no-one will lose their licences under what he always refers 
to as "this beautiful regulation". (Suara Karya, 26 June 
1991] 
The Jakarta Post could not conceal its dismay at this 
anti-climax. Had the MPs forgotten to get the editors' 
message across? Not a word about editors having the right 
to defend themselves . or about who should have the fina.I 
say over the charge of violating the Press Law. Basically, 
said the paper, it is the government that has nothing to fear. 
There are strict security measures in place, preventing left-
wing penetration of the press as anyone wanting to work for 
a newspaper "is asked about their family background, at 
least up to their grandparents". Then the editorial said: 
Our editors are so careful now that they do not even have 
enough courage to print any stories about not-so-sensitive 
issues, let alone anything involving anti-Pancasila ideology 
which would mean a pointless and stupid suicide. [Jakarta 
Post, 21 June] Jf 
US student refused entry 
A doctoral student at the University of Wisconsin who has 
spent years researching Indonesian social issues was refused 
entry when she arrived in Jakarta in July for a visit. 
Kay Mohlman has visited Indonesia several times; in 
1979-1980 she taught English at Anadalas University, 
Padang and studied Indonesian in Malang. In 1987, she 
applied for permission for research on squatter settlements, 
a project endorsed by Satya Wacana University, Salatiga 
but the IDstitute of Sciences, UPI turned it down. A year 
later, another research project was turned down. 
Frustrated, she decided to do research work in the 
Philippines instead. She arrived in Jakarta from Manila to 
join her boyfriend on vacation in Bali. An immigration 
official claimed that she had applied for a visa at the 
Indonesian Embassy in Washington but had been refused. 
An Indonesian friend denied this and said she was on a 
private visit to Indonesia to be with her fiance. [Tempo, 13 
July 1991] • 
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New BAe Hawks accord with Indonesia 
On 20 June, British Aerospace announced an agreement with Indonesia~ aerospace industry, IPTN, 
for the joint production of Hawk fighter aircraft in Indonesia. In London for the deal, Dr. B.J. Habibie, 
chief executive of IPTN, said that Indonesia needs 69 Hawk aircraft which could cost a total of £2 
billion. Prime Minister John Major received Habibie on the day before the agreement was signed. 
CAAT and TAPOL oppose the deal 
On 21 June, TAPOL together with the Campaign Against 
Arms Trade issued a press release announcing that 
they had written to Prime Minister John Major to protest 
against the agreement announced between British Aerospace 
and IPTN, for the co-production of Hawk jet trainer and 
light attack fighter aircraft. 
The deal ·was announced during a visit to London by 
Indonesia's Minister for Research and Technology, Dr B.J. 
Habibie, who is also President Director of IPTN and head 
of all the other Indonesian .state companies manufacturing 
armaments and naval vessels. Besides being received by 
John Major, Habibie held meetings with Government 
ministers, including Alan Clarke, Minister for Defence 
Procurement. 
This iS · the latest in a long series of contracts between 
IPTN and British Aerospace involving the export of Hawk 
aircraft, Rapier missiles, the transfer of technology and the 
construction of a technology college for members of the 
Indonesian armed forces. 
In their letter to John Major, CAAT and TAPOL protested 
that this deal would promote IPTN as the base for the 
manufacture of military aircraft for use not only in 
Indonesia but throughout Southeast Asia and the South 
Pacific. 
At a time when there is growing pressure worldwide to 
cut back arms production and exports and to reduce 
expenditure on military equipment, a principle which your 
own Government says it subcribes to, such a deal is totally 
unacceptable. · 
Moreover, as your Government is well aware, Indonesia 
is engaged in a war of aggression in East Timor in 
violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 384 and 389 
which were . supported ·by Britain. The Indonesian armed 
forces are also at this very moment perpetrating large-
scale atrocities against the people of Aceh in North 
Sumatra. There can be no justification for the British 
Government to reinforce Indonesia~ fighting capability 
when it is behaving . in such an aggressive and repressive fashion. · ' 
The two organisations called upon the Government to re-
consider any decision already taken and not to allow this 
agreement to go ahead. 
CAA T also issued its own press release in which CAA T 
coordinator, Ann Feltham was quqted as saying: "In 1989 
British Aerospace wanted to export the Hawk fighter to 
Iraq. After protests from CAA T and the Kurdish 
community, the Government finally decided not to allow 
the sale. BAe appears not to have . learnt from this. They 
now want to sell to another dictator, General Suharto, 
whose armed forces have also invaded a neighbouring 
territory, East Timor, and continue to occupy it in defiance 
of United Nations Security Council resolutions." 
CAAT also said that despite the invasion of East Timor in 
1975 and the appalling human rights record of the S~arto 
regime, the United Kingdom is a major supplier of 
weaponry to Indonesia. As well as previous Hawk deals in 
the late 1970s and the early 1980s, other sales have 
included frigates from Vosper Thomycroft, surface-to-air 
missiles from BAe and surveillance radar from Plessey. )I.. 
French and US deals to militarise 
CN-235 aircraft 
Habibie has .also struck major deals regarding equipment to 
convert the CN-235 aircraft, a civilian plane currently 
manufactured by IPTN under licence . with the Spanish 
company, CASA, for military use. A deal concluded with 
Messier-Bugatti during the Paris Air Fair in May involves 
co-production of landing-gear to progress to the production 
of a military-type CN-235. 
A deal with the US company, McDonnel-Douglas will 
facilitate the productipn by the IP'IN of harpoon missiles, 
jointly researched by the two companies, to. convert the 
CN-235 aircraft for use as maritime patrol aircraft. Habibie 
has also concluded a deal with the Allison General Motors 
Corporation gas-turbine division to enable IP'IN to use the 
CMA-2100 engine on the N-250, enabling it to take off 
from a short runway. In exchange for a licence to use the 
CMA-2100 engine, IPTN will become a maintenance 
centre for the engine. [Indonesian News, 15 July 1991] 
All-in-all, Habibie's trip to Western Europe this year has 
marked a significant advance for IPTN in the form of the 
transfer of technology, reinforcing the Indonesian 
company's role a8 a producer of military aircraft. .. 
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Problems for refugees unresolved 
Thousan.ds of West Papuan re'fu,gees have been living at a camp in East Awin, Papua New Guinea for 
years with no prospect of a status that would give them freedom of movement or. QS)'lum in a third 
country. TAPOL has recently received several documents from the re'fu,ge~s which highlight the 
difficulties und,er which they n.ow live. 
Mes~age for MPs whose camp visit 
never took place 
A plan by the refugees to present a statement to Australian 
MPs who were in PNG earlier this year was thwarted by 
the PNG government's refusal to allow the MPs to visit the 
camp. A large group of MPs from the Australian 
Parliament's Defence, and Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Commissions were in PNG in February this year. 
The statement which was signed by camp leaders Ignatius 
Ariak, Karel Waromi and Michael Kareth first recalled the 
history of betrayal which led to West Papua's coionisation 
by Indonesia. It drew attentiog to the atrocities that have 
been inflicted on the people under Indonesian rule. It urged 
the Australian government and parliament: 
1. to bring the issue of West Papua to the attention of the 
UN Secretary General, 
2. to call on the PNG government whose country now has 
to look after West Papuan refugees, to place the issue of 
West Papua on the agenda of the South Pacific Forum, 
3. to call on the Dutch government tQ stand by its 1961 
commitment to prepare an independent West Papuan state, 
4. to call the UN to task for its failure (to reject) the 1969 
Act of Free Choice, and 
5. to intercede in setting up talks between Indonesia and 
the OPM (Free Papua Organisation). 
Conflict with local landowners 
A letter from refugees in Iowara camp (East Awin Camp is 
divided into a number of camps) draws attention to the 
repercussions of the PNG government's failure to 
compensate the landowners whose land has been taken over 
to accommodate the East Awin Camp. The letter says that 
on 10 June this year, the main road connecting Iowara 
camp with the Fly River at Rimsite was blocked by the 
~ad people who live between Lake Murray, Iowara and 
Nomet. Large trees were used to prevent trucks going along 
the road and people were camped along the road to prevent 
anyone going by foot. A similar road block was set up in 
March 1990 by the Dridamasuk people of the Awin tribe. 
In both instances the protest was directed at the PNG 
government for its failure to compensate the local people. 
"We fully respect their demands but we and the camp 
officials are affected because it is impossible to travel to 
Kiunga or Iowara." 
The letter reports that Khonoi Ikorere, head of the Border 
Affairs Commission, told the refugees on 21 June that 
according to the UNHCR, the refugees should now become 
self-supporting and not receive any more help, with the 
result that supplies of food and medicines are to be cut. The 
refugees will also have to pay for truck transport to bring 
in supplies. A Dutch agency, ZOA, which has been 
supporting the refugees for some time will soon withdraw. 
"Although we understand this decision, it is difficult to 
accept under the present difficulties. The distance from 
Iowara to Kiunga is 60 kms, 45 kms over land and 15 kms 
on water: There are no sago stands which also means no 
roofmg material. Moreover, the soil consists of clay and is 
difficult to cultivate. The rivers have no water source so we 
will always have problems with water. The land for which 
no compensation has been paid is the main reason for our 
declining chance to become self-sustaining." 
The letter concludes by saying that however much they 
may suffer, they will not return to Indonesia. 
Youth Association letter 
The West Papuan Youth Solidarity Association, based in 
the Blackwater Camp of East Awin, has also written to 
TAPOL drawing our attention to the poor conditions at the 
camp. It points out that there is pressure on the refugees to 
agree to return to Indonesia. "The PNG government Jays 
greater emphasis on maintaining its relationship with 
Indonesia th.an on solving the refugee problem." 
Submission to the UN 
Refugees in East Awin have made a submission on their 
difficulties to the UN Human Rights Centre in Geneva. In 
a Jetter acknowledging the submission, Jakob Th. Muller, 
chief of the communications section, said the 
communication will be "confidentially submitted to the 
(UN) Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities". This means that the submission will be 
discussed. at the Sub-Commission's August 1991 session in 
Geneva under Resolution 1503, a procedure which· does not 
allow the discussions or the conclusions to be made public. 
TAPOL has not yet received a copy of the submissio~ 
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Ed11nl by Rob,·rt Cnhb 
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1965-1966: Studies from 
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This is a book that could and should have been published 
years ago, a criticism intended for all of us, academics and 
activists alike. Incredible as it may seem, it has taken a 
quarter of a century for a book to appear that attempts to 
analyse the nationwide massacres which accompanied Suh-
arto's rise to power and to publish for the first time several 
important descriptive documents. Cribb rightly calls it a 
first attempt at mapping the significance of the killings for 
Indonesian history, rather than a final statement. 
It is true that in other countries - , Germany and Cambodia 
are the most obvious examples - events of this magnitude, 
as he says, have provoked deep introspection, but the 
comparison is not really applicable, for in Indonesia the 
criminals are still in power. Indeed, from time to time they 
publicly brag about their feats against defenceless victims. 
Take for instance Yasir Hadibrqto, the self-proclaimed 
murderer of Aidit who later became the governor of Lam-
pung, or the Acehnese parliamentarian who last year offered' 
his services to the army to help exterminate 'GPK' rebels, 
boasting of how he had actiyely help,-rid the region of 
communists in 1965. · · . 
The shortage of information, which Cribb discusses in his 
introduction, is the crux of the problem. The prime sources 
are those who witnessed the events, often intended victims 
who managed to survive. But deep fear has prevented them 
from speaking out and those who did put pen to paper have 
insisted on anonymity. One chapter of this book consists of 
accounts like this, supplied to TAPOL many years ago by 
a group of Indonesians then living in Germany. Others have 
become available recently as PKI members in Indonesia 
have started encouraging as many people as possible to 
write down everything they know. These are the people 
who mighl . well be able to direct investigators to mass 
graves though, it must be said, such investigations could 
only be carried out in secret. 
Two of the accounts published were the result of a 
research project about village education when the 
researchers discovered inadvertently how conflict between 
left and right among teachers in 1965 had led.to a blood-
bath in the village. The . victims were arrested in October 
1965, on the basis of membership lists of the PKl-d(>mi-
nated teachers' union used by the PKI's most militant 
adversary, himself a teacher. 
As the days went by and the makeshift prison was filled, 
news began to get through of widespread ki.llings in other 
parts of the residency.... So on about 20 October, the first 
group of those condemned were taken by the soldiers to a 
nearby field to be killed. A s4able number of villagers went 
along to watch..... By the time the ki.lling was over, some 
120 to 130 had been Id.lied. This included seven lurahs, 
eighty SD [primary school] teachers and sundry pamong 
[local government offi~ials]. . 
The Purwodadi affair 
In 1965 and 1966 the Indonesian press recorded virtually 
nothing of the killings that were sweeping the countryside. 
Strangely, Cribb explains this in terms of the stifling ?f 
investigative journalism before October 1965 when twenty-
one papers were banned but fails to mention the closedown 
of all leftwing and pro-Sukarno newspapers on Suharto's 
orders by early on 2 October. From then on, the press 
became the platform for malicious anti-communist propa-
ganda, not a word of· whiCh could be challenged. The role 
of the press in instigating and encouraging the slaughter 
cannot be underestimated. 
It was not until early 1969 that the silence about the 
killings was shattered by a report in· Harian Kami, quoting 
human rights activist HJ. C. Princen, just back from a trip 
to Central Java with two Dutch journalists, that two to three 
thousand people had been killed by. troops in the Purwodadi 
area since November 1968. The army leadership tried to 
squash the story by calling Princen a communist. When the 
military commander of Central Java issued an open invita-
tion to journalists to "see things for themselves". several 
took up the challenge, only to discover that they would 
have a guided tour under army escort. 
Two lengthy reports are reproduced, one by · Maskun 
Iskandar of Indonesia Raya~ published in seven instalments 
under_ the title, "Report from Purwodadi, Area of Death", 
tJie·other by Yopie Lasut of Sinar Harapan, of which five 
instalments appeared. The remaining instalments never 
appeared. Instead there was a brief announcement saying: 
The government has concluded that Princen ~ information_ 
concerning mass ki.llings in Pwwodadi is connected with 
PK! remnants who wish to discredit the government. And if 
there were ki.llings, then they were the result of military 
actions taken under martial law.' 
Although under escort, Iskandar heard a great deal but 
could not check anything. He was told by an official source 
that 300 prisoners had been killed in desa Simo, 250 in 
Cerewek, 200 in Kalisari, 100 in Kuwu, 200 in Tanjungsari. 
The following passage conveys his frustration at not being 
able to discover the truth: 
Was it true that there was a grave behind Cerewek 
railway station which had recently been planted with 
banana trees?... Someone had told me there were graves 
along the river in Tanjungsari . but our escort did not let us 
see any of these things. I got tired of writing down the 
names of villages where there were supposed to have been 
executions and burials .... 
There was an official who told me that the arrests had 
gone on for a month from 27 July [1968]. When the 
prisoners had been collecte~ they took seventy-five away 
each night, in two lots. !Ater this became less and they only 
took away seventy .i.jive prisoners every Saturday night. 
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Lasut visited the area, along with another journalist, 
without informing the military but encountered the same 
difficulties in getting at the truth. They were aware all the 
time that local army officers quickly learnt of their presence 
in a village. What they did discover was that a civil guard 
named Mami, who had been the original source of Princen's 
disclosure had been kidnapped and had since disappeared. 
He quoted Catholic and Muslim leaders in the area who 
were willing to point the location of the graves to an 
investigating team. 
For three weeks in March 1969, the Jakarta press dis-
played an insatiable interest in the Purwodadi Affair but 
this was snuffed out and silence about the killings has 
prevailed ever since. 
The reproduction of the two Purwodadi articles is the 
most important contribution in the book to an understanding 
of how the army has successfully prevented any 
investigation of the mass crimes committed in Indonesia 
since 1965. Michael van Langenberg analyses the close link 
between the killings and Suharto's dramatic seizure of 
power. Kenneth Young gives a penetrating analysis of the 
role of lqcal political conflicts prior to October 1965 in 
BOOK REVIEW 
helping to ignite the killings. There are several studies by 
the Gadjah Mada . Centre o( Village Studies which investi-
gated the mounting political antagonism sparked by PKI 
pressure to implement the 1960 agrarian reform Jaw in 
places which later became arenas for some of the worst 
mass killings. But the studies stop short of investigating 
what happened to the PKI activists once the killings began. 
The most glaring omission in the Cribb collection is that 
there is nothing more than a passing reference to the role of 
the US in aiding and abetting the massacres, documented in 
the cable traffic between the US embassy in Jakarta and the 
State Department. But, as Cribb says, this is only a first 
attempt, not the final statement. The book is essential 
reading for a deeper understanding of the crimes for . which 
Suharto and his cohorts have yet to be forced to account. 
World leaders like Helmut Kohl, the latest to welcome 
Suharto, should be reminded in no uncertain terms that they 
are embracing a murderer and there is plenty in this volume 
to provide the ammunition for such a charge. ~ 
rc1r 
' ... ~ 1 
During Suharto'.s five-day state visit to Germany at the beginning of July, many hundreds of people took part in protest demonstrations in 
&nn and Berlin, including Moluccans, West Papuans, Indonesians· and Germans. Many issues were raised. There were calls for an end 
to economic aid to Indonesia, for the right of self ~determination for people who have been colonised by Indonesia, against the plunder of 
the rain-forests, and for Suharto to be called to account for the one million who died in 1965/66. During their meetings with him, the 
Chancellor, Helmut Koh~ and President Richard von Weizsiicker raised the question of human rights violations with Suharto. 
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Travel ban on Petition-of-SO still stands 
Endless discussion about the travel ban on members of the Petition-of-50 group has not resulted',in 
the ban being lifted but it has focused attention on a document that was highly critical of President 
Suharto. 
The Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, 
Sudomo, bas told members of the Petition-of-SO group that 
the government will not lift the travel ban preventing them 
from going abroad unle~ they make a formal, written 
apology to President Suharto. Sudomo told them their 1980 
Petition was an 'insult' to the President. He has not 
explained why the government has refrained from charging 
them in court; many cases have been brought against a 
variety of people during the 1980s for 'insulting' the 
President. In response to suggestions that the government 
lay formal charges against members of the Petition-of-SO 
group, Sudomo has said it was up to t}\.em to go to court if 
they want to challenge the legitimacy of the travel ban. 
The six-point Petition-of-50 drawn up on 5 May 1980 
and presented soon afterwards to Parliament, was strongly 
critical of two speeches delivered earlier that year by 
President Suharto. Among the many criticisms, . it argued' 
that Suharto apparently regarded himself as the per8onifiC3-
tion of the Pancasila because any remarJcs that were critical 
of him were branded as being anti-Pancasila. The group 
includes several former ministers, politicians and members 
of the armed forces. The most prominent of .its members is 
Lieutenant-General (retired) Ali Sadikin, formerly governor 
of Jakarta. 
Since the Petition was signed, the signatories have been 
denied bank credit and other .business facilities; have been 
excluded from certain social events and until recently, could 
not be quoted in the media. 
Condemned to civil death 
In the past few months however, far from lacking publicity, 
everything involving the group has become a media event. 
They had a much publicised meeting with Sudomo, 
attended also by domestic and foreign journalists, but 
Sudomo was unmoved by their demand for an end to what 
they term their condemnation to civil death. Sudomo said 
nothing could change until they apologised to the president 
and invited them to take their complaints to Parliament. 
This Jed to much publicised preparations for the meeting 
with MPs. Before the MPs met the petitioners, however, 
they trooped along to see Sudomo and were told in no 
uncertain terms that nothing could change the government's 
insistence on an apology before the travel ban could be 
lifted. 
In such circumstances, the meeting between Ali Sadikin 
and other petitioners with Parliament was not likely to 
change the travel ban. Yet there was some frank talking by 
certain MPs about the state of the nation. During the 
discussion, which took place in · the presence of many 
reporters and observers, a woman MP of the armed forces 
group, Police Colonel Rukmini, said that like the Petition 
group, Parliament has been analysing whether the political 
and economic systems were in accordance with the consti-
tution. The House Commission of which. she is a member 
had discussed why reforms proposed by the House in the 
past often ended in failure". [Jakarta Post~ Sn/1991) 
~/' 
Lieutenant-General Ali Sadikin, a prom~nt figure in the 
Petition -of-5Q group. 
The next step appears to be an attempt, mediated by the 
chair of Parliament, Kharis Suhud, to arrange a meeting 
between the petitioners and Suharto himself. There is little 
likelihood that such a meeting will take plaQe, given their 
refusal to apologise. Yet talk of · such a meeting keeps the 
issue in the public eye. 
This long-running saga which seems to be leading 
nowhere may have a deeper political significance. With the 
question of the presidential succession so much on every-
body's minds, there are people in the armed forces who 
want to focus attention on a document that is highly critical 
of Suharto, while members of the P-50-group clearly enjoy 
being part of the game. * 
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